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ABSTRACT 
  Racially polarized voting makes minorities more vulnerable to 
discriminatory changes in election laws and therefore implicates nearly 
every voting rights doctrine. In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme 
Court held that racially polarized voting is a necessary—but not a 
sufficient—condition for a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act. The Court, however, has recently questioned the 
propriety of recognizing the existence of racially polarized voting. This 
colorblind approach threatens not only the Gingles factors but also 
Section 2’s constitutionality. 
  The Court treats racially polarized voting as a modern 
phenomenon. But the relevant starting point is the 1860s, not the 1960s. 
Prior to the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage, Republicans received 
overwhelming support from newly enfranchised Black voters in the 
former Confederate States and expected that support to continue. The 
Reconstruction Framers were thus attentive to the realities of racially 
polarized voting and openly recognized that extending the franchise 
would empower Black voters to mobilize politically and protect their 
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own interests. Racially polarized voting was a feature—not a bug—in 
the passage and ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. Accordingly, 
this Article argues that the Court’s treatment of racially polarized 
voting as a constitutional taboo is historically unfounded and 
doctrinally incoherent. 
  There are significant implications for acknowledging the role of 
racially polarized voting during Reconstruction. This historical insight 
moves vote dilution claims—and their predicate finding of racially 
polarized voting—far closer to the heart of the Reconstruction 
Amendments and challenges the Court’s hostility to race-based 
redistricting. It is powerful evidence that Congress is well within its 
enforcement authority to remedy and deter dilutive measures that 
exploit racially polarized voting. Finally, reconstructing racially 
polarized voting helps reorient voting rights doctrine toward a 
Fifteenth Amendment framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Racially polarized voting stalks our democracy. A half century 
after the civil rights movement, race remains a central fault line in 
elections across the country. In fact, polarization between Black and 
White voters has increased nationwide since the mid-1990s and is 
particularly high in the South.1 Racially polarized voting “increases the 
vulnerability of racial minorities to discriminatory changes in voting 
law.”2 That is because a law designed to diminish minority voting 
strength will not have its intended discriminatory effect unless racial 
groups vote as a bloc.3 In other words, gerrymanderers can exploit 
racially polarized voting when drawing maps to reduce or effectively 
eliminate minority political power. Racially polarized voting thus 
implicates nearly every voting rights doctrine. 
Perhaps most prominently, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
(“VRA”)4 ensures that minority voters are not “packed” or “cracked” 
in a redistricting plan, thereby diluting their voting strength.5 Under 
Thornburg v. Gingles,6 racially polarized voting is a necessary—but not 
a sufficient—condition for a statutory vote dilution claim.7 The so-
 
 1. Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323, 1349 (2016) 
[hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power]. 
 2. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 578 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also 
N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 222 (4th Cir. 2016) (“Racially polarized 
voting is not, in and of itself, evidence of racial discrimination. But it does provide an incentive 
for intentional discrimination in the regulation of elections.”). 
 3. See, e.g., McCrory, 831 F.3d at 222 (“It is the political cohesiveness of the minority groups 
that provides the political payoff for legislators who seek to dilute or limit the minority vote.”). 
 4. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2018). Section 2 is a “permanent, nationwide ban on racial 
discrimination in voting.” Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557. Section 2 covers both vote denial and 
vote dilution claims and imposes liability based on a finding of discriminatory intent or effect. See 
Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 229, 243–44 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc). For a discussion of how to 
establish liability under Section 2, see infra Part I.C. 
 5. See Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1663, 1671–72 (2001) [hereinafter Gerken, Undiluted Vote]. 
 6. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
 7. See id. at 48–51. Vote dilution can also occur if districts violate the one-person, one-vote 
principle. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 563 (1964). This Article uses vote dilution as a 
shorthand for racial vote dilution. 
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called Gingles factors thus require plaintiffs to establish that racial 
minorities are “politically cohesive” and that the “majority votes 
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidate.”8 
Notwithstanding its centrality under Gingles, the role of racial bloc 
voting under current doctrine is hotly contested—a debate that reflects 
the colorblind concerns now animating equal protection doctrine. This 
view was perhaps best captured in Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion 
in Holder v. Hall,9 where he declared that “[t]he assumptions upon 
which our vote dilution decisions have been based should be repugnant 
to any nation that strives for the ideal of a color-blind Constitution.”10 
In addition, a plurality of the Court cast doubt on Section 2’s 
constitutionality when it cautioned against an interpretation that 
“unnecessarily infuse[d] race into virtually every redistricting” plan.11 
Justices have also questioned whether Congress can exercise its 
Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority to remedy racial 
bloc voting, which they have characterized as private action by voters.12 
The Court thus views Section 2’s race-conscious predicate for liability 
with suspicion. 
These colorblind sentiments have surfaced outside the four 
corners of vote dilution doctrine. In Shaw v. Reno,13 the Court created 
an “analytically distinct”14 racial gerrymandering cause of action under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to challenge 
majority-minority districts.15 Under Shaw, if “race was the 
predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a 
 
 8. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. This Article uses the terms “racially polarized voting” and “racial 
bloc voting” interchangeably. There is no magic ratio for racial bloc voting, and the legally 
sufficient ratio “will vary according to a variety of factual circumstances.” Id. at 57–58; see also 
Christopher S. Elmendorf, Kevin M. Quinn & Marisa A. Abrajano, Racially Polarized Voting, 83 
U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 611 (2016) [hereinafter Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting] (finding 
that “the lower courts have been very reluctant to establish quantitative cutoffs for what is, or is 
not, legally significant minority cohesion”); infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 9. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994). 
 10. Id. at 905–06 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 11. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (plurality opinion) (quoting League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 446 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)). 
 12. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 216–17 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting); infra Parts II.B–C. 
 13. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 14. Id. at 652. 
 15. See id. at 658.  
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significant number of voters within or without a particular district,”16 
then the legislature must establish that the “district . . . withstand[s] 
strict scrutiny.”17 In justifying this new cause of action, the Court 
harshly criticized the purposeful creation of majority-minority districts. 
According to the Court, “the perception that members of the same 
racial group . . . think alike, share the same political interests, and will 
prefer the same candidates at the polls” is an “impermissible racial 
stereotype[].”18 Because Section 2 ties liability to the presence of racial 
bloc voting and mandates the creation of majority-minority districts 
under certain circumstances, Shaw has long been viewed as being on a 
collision course with the VRA.19 
At the core of the Court’s anxiety about race and voting is a belief 
that race-based redistricting “balkanize[s] us into competing racial 
factions” and “threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political 
system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation 
continues to aspire.”20 Despite its invocation of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, the Court implicitly treats racially polarized voting as a 
recent development, one that emerged after the passage of the VRA 
and the widespread reenfranchisement of Black voters in the South. 
Compounding this error, the Court assumes that the Constitution 
uniquely empowers the judiciary to push our nation toward a post-
racial politics. Put simply, the Court presumes that the Reconstruction 
Amendments envision a society where racially polarized voting no 
longer exists. But the Court has reached this conclusion only by 
ignoring the historical context of the Reconstruction Amendments and 
by transplanting its colorblind jurisprudence from the Equal Protection 
Clause to the political realm.21 
 
 16. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
 17. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017). 
 18. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647. 
 19. See Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1696–98. 
 20. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657; see also id. at 648 (commenting that “a racial gerrymander may 
exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes 
said to counteract”). 
 21. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transformation 
of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1845 (1992) [hereinafter Issacharoff, 
Polarized Voting] (commenting that “[t]he Court [has] recast voting rights claims in the mold of 
Washington v. Davis”). 
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My central claim is that the Reconstruction Framers recognized 
the realities of racially polarized voting and that, given the prominent 
role of originalism on the Court today,22 this fact complicates the 
application of colorblind principles to vote dilution claims. At the 
outset, it is important to dispel the myth that the Constitution is 
oblivious of political parties. Whereas the Founders failed to foresee 
the rise of party politics,23 the Reconstruction Framers were intimately 
familiar with partisanship. Indeed, the Reconstruction Amendments 
were passed and ratified along nearly uniform party-line votes.24  
Prior to the Fifteenth Amendment, Republicans received 
overwhelming support from newly enfranchised Black voters in the 
former Confederate States and expected that support to continue.25 
Racially polarized voting was a feature—not a bug—in the passage and 
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court’s 
apprehension about acknowledging the existence of racially polarized 
voting is misplaced. 
Recognizing the role of racially polarized voting in the ratification 
of the Fifteenth Amendment has significant doctrinal and normative 
implications. This historical insight moves vote dilution claims—and 
their predicate finding of racial bloc voting—far closer to the heart of 
the Reconstruction Amendments. At a minimum, it is powerful 
evidence that Congress is well within its Reconstruction Amendment 
 
 22. See, e.g., William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2352–53 
(2015). 
 23. See, e.g., Chiafalo v. Washington, 140 S. Ct. 2316, 2320–21 (2020); Daryl J. Levinson & 
Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006). 
 24. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS 
AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 398–400 (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION]; 
see also Michael S. Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1379, 1393–94 (2020) 
[hereinafter Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering] (discussing partisanship in the nineteenth 
century). 
 25. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 236 (1998) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS] (attributing President Grant’s popular-vote victory in the 
1868 election to Black voters in the former Confederacy); Vikram David Amar & Alan 
Brownstein, The Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REV. 915, 943 (1998) (“New black 
voters were expected to vote Republican . . . .”); Travis Crum, The Superfluous Fifteenth 
Amendment?, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1549, 1597 (2020) [hereinafter Crum, Superfluous] (discussing 
the Reconstruction Framers’ “ideological, partisan, and pragmatic” motives for supporting the 
Fifteenth Amendment). 
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enforcement authority to remedy and deter dilutive measures that 
exploit racially polarized voting.26  
In addition, viewing racially polarized voting from the perspective 
of Reconstruction challenges the Court’s hostility toward race-based 
redistricting. After all, if the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified on the 
premise that racially polarized voting exists, then the Court’s treatment 
of racially polarized voting as constitutionally taboo is historically 
unfounded. And it is especially difficult to square the Court’s self-
proclaimed power to push our nation toward a post-racial politics with 
the Reconstruction Framers’ understanding about both the judiciary’s 
proper role and the persistence of racial bloc voting. 
Perhaps most ambitiously, reconstructing racially polarized voting 
reorients voting rights doctrine away from the tired debates 
surrounding the Equal Protection Clause. The Reconstruction Framers 
demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of the intersection of race 
and politics. The Court’s refusal to even acknowledge these insights 
has contributed to the tension within current doctrine between vote 
dilution and racial gerrymandering claims. Rather than embodying a 
colorblind worldview, the central premise of the Fifteenth Amendment 
was to empower racial minorities through the ballot. And although 
other scholars correctly point out that voting rights are distinct from 
civil rights and thus deserve a different doctrinal framework, these 
accounts are derived from political theory and statutory interpretation, 
rather than a historical and contextual understanding of the 
Reconstruction Amendments.27 To be clear, I am not arguing that 
racially polarized voting is a desirable or inevitable characteristic of our 
democracy. Rather, my claim is that contemporary doctrine should 
account for the fact that the Reconstruction Framers were aware of 
 
 26. The Court has declined to decide whether vote dilution claims are cognizable under the 
Fifteenth Amendment. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993). The Court, however, 
has recognized such claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 
755, 765–67 (1973); see also infra Part I.C.1.  
 27. See, e.g., Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1671 & n.9 (focusing on Section 2 in 
analyzing vote dilution claims); Michael S. Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE 
L.J. 734, 736–38 (2008) [hereinafter Kang, Democratic Contestation] (discussing the concept of 
democratic contestation in relation to the VRA); Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why 
Voting is Different, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (1996) (“We believe that the Court’s attempt to 
integrate voting rights law into its more general approach to affirmative action is both misguided 
and incoherent.”). But see Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 919 (arguing that the Shaw 
“Court’s approach directly contradicts the reasoning and objectives of the framers and ratifiers of 
the Fifteenth Amendment”).  
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racially polarized voting and developed their political and 
constitutional strategies in its shadow. 
Finally, this Article’s revitalization of the Fifteenth Amendment 
is especially timely given that 2020 marks the Amendment’s 150th 
anniversary.28 The Fifteenth Amendment has been largely 
overshadowed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA,29 but it 
played a vital role in establishing and then restoring our nation’s 
multiracial democracy.30 Moreover, this summer’s Black Lives Matter 
protests have forced a reckoning with our nation’s racist past and 
present on a scale not witnessed since the civil rights movement.31 And 
the recent passing of civil rights icon John Lewis has reignited calls to 
revise and expand the VRA.32 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I surveys the existence of 
racially polarized voting today and then explains how racially polarized 
voting is treated as part of a racial vote dilution claim under the 
Constitution and the VRA. Part II outlines the most frequent criticisms 
of considering racially polarized voting as part of a vote dilution claim. 
Part III examines racially polarized voting during Reconstruction and 
its central role in the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage and ratification. 
Part IV argues that recognizing the role of racial bloc voting during 
Reconstruction not only strengthens the Gingles factors but also helps 
reconceptualize vote dilution claims under the Fifteenth 
Amendment.33  
 
 28. 16 Stat. 1131 (1870). The Fifteenth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of citizens of 
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1, and 
empowers Congress to “enforce [it] by appropriate legislation,” id. § 2. 
 29. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1550–51. 
 30. See id. at 1621–22. 
 31. See Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the 
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2ZqRyOU 
[https://perma.cc/WX2R-62RP] (discussing the extraordinary scale of the Black Lives Matter 
protests).  
 32. See Ari Berman, Senators Introduced a Bill To Restore the Voting Rights Act. It’s Named 
After John Lewis, MOTHER JONES (July 22, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/07/
senators-just-introduced-a-bill-to-restore-the-voting-rights-act-its-named-after-john-lewis 
[https://perma.cc/S7PZ-FGMY] (explaining the newly introduced John Lewis Voting Rights 
Advancement Act).  
 33. Before moving on, a couple caveats. I primarily discuss Black–White polarization for 
three reasons. First, although the rights of other minorities were discussed during Reconstruction, 
the principal debate over the Fifteenth Amendment concerned the enfranchisement of Black 
citizens. See WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE 
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 46, 58 (2d ed. 1969). Second, Black–White polarization is currently and 
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I.  UNDERSTANDING RACIAL VOTE DILUTION 
This Part defines racially polarized voting and provides a brief 
overview of its role in contemporary American politics. It then charts 
the development of racial vote dilution doctrine under both the 
Constitution and the VRA and discusses the doctrinal relevance of 
racially polarized voting. 
A. Defining Racially Polarized Voting 
Racially polarized voting and vote dilution are intertwined 
concepts. Racially polarized voting has legal significance because it can 
be exploited by gerrymanderers to dilute minority voting power.34 In 
jurisdictions with racially polarized voting, politicians can predict that 
certain redistricting schemes—such as “packing” or “cracking” 
minority voters or using numbered posts in an at-large election—will 
dilute minority voting strength.35 Racially polarized voting thus 
“increases the vulnerability of racial minorities to discriminatory 
changes in voting law” by putting them “at risk of being systematically 
outvoted and having their interests underrepresented in legislatures” 
 
has historically been more severe than polarization between White voters and other minorities. 
See Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, supra note 1, at 1357. And third, the overwhelming 
majority of Section 2 suits have been brought by Black plaintiffs. See Ellen Katz, Margaret 
Aisenbrey, Anna Baldwin, Emma Cheuse & Anna Weisbrodt, Documenting Discrimination in 
Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 643, 656 (2006) [hereinafter Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination] (finding that 
Black plaintiffs brought 82.2 percent of Section 2 cases between 1982 and 2006). 
Furthermore, even though the Fifteenth Amendment enfranchised only men of color and 
left women of color without the right to vote, I will generally avoid using gendered terms to 
streamline the reading process and to focus on race. For a thorough discussion of the women’s 
suffrage movement, see generally Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, 
Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002). For a recent academic 
account of the intersection of race and sex in the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments, see 
generally Catherine Powell & Camille Gear Rich, The “Welfare Queen” Goes to the Polls: Race-
Based Fractures in Gender Politics and Opportunities for Intersectional Coalitions, 108 GEO. L.J. 
105 (2020).  
Finally, although the norms on this issue are still evolving, I have opted to capitalize both 
Black and White when used as racial identifiers. See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Case for 
Capitalizing the B in Black, ATLANTIC (June 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/
ideas/archive/2020/06/time-to-capitalize-blackand-white/613159 [https://perma.cc/K988-5YVY] 
(“Black and white are both historically created racial identities—and whatever rule applies to one 
should apply to the other.”). 
 34. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 578 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 35. See, e.g., N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 222 (4th Cir. 2016); 
Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1672. 
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and by creating “an incentive to prevent changes in the existing balance 
of voting power.”36 As explained below,37 vote dilution—that is, the 
redistricting map or electoral scheme that prevents minorities from 
having an opportunity to elect their candidates of choice—violates 
both the Constitution and the VRA. Racially polarized voting itself is 
neither a constitutional nor a statutory violation but is rather a 
predicate condition for vote dilution.38 
Although racially polarized voting is an intuitive concept, it defies 
easy doctrinal definition. There is no fixed formula for ascertaining 
when voting is racially polarized.39 Rather, the inquiry is whether 
minorities are “politically cohesive” and whether the “majority votes 
sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . usually to defeat the minority’s 
preferred candidate.”40 The legally sufficient ratio “will vary according 
to a variety of factual circumstances,”41 including the percentage of 
registered voters who are minorities, the presence of majority-vote 
requirements, the use of designated posts in multimember elections, 
and the size of the district.42 Moreover, racial bloc voting need not 
occur in every election in the district, and the victory of a minority 
candidate in a particular election does not foreclose a finding of racially 
 
 36. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 578 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 37. See infra Part I.C. 
 38. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 578 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Professor Chris Elmendorf 
has a distinct take on racially polarized voting. He raises the provocative thesis that certain 
“election outcome[s] [are] unconstitutional owing to the racial basis for the electorate’s verdict” 
and that “Section 2 prevents or compensates for a type of constitutional violation that the courts 
cannot remedy through ordinary constitutional litigation.” Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making 
Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 
U. PA. L. REV. 377, 456 (2012) [hereinafter Elmendorf, Biased Votes]. My argument does not go 
so far. My claim differs from Elmendorf’s in at least two salient ways. First, I examine the role of 
racially polarized voting during Reconstruction—a period that Elmendorf ignores—to argue that 
the Court’s treatment of racial bloc voting as a legal taboo is historically inaccurate and doctrinally 
incoherent. And second, I disagree with Elmendorf that certain elections are themselves 
unconstitutional due to racial bloc voting. My focus, instead, is on the dilutive measures that 
exploit racial bloc voting. As Professors Pam Karlan and Daryl Levinson argue, even though 
citizens’ voting preferences are assuredly protected and “the government cannot reach and 
regulate directly the private decisionmaking that produces a disparate racial impact,” the law 
should not give those preferences effect through electoral mechanisms that predictably dilute the 
votes of politically cohesive racial minorities. Karlan & Levinson, supra note 27, at 1228. 
 39. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 58 (1986) (“[T]here is no simple doctrinal test for 
the existence of legally significant racial bloc voting.”). 
 40. Id. at 51.  
 41. Id. at 57–58. 
 42. See id. at 57. 
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polarized voting.43 In light of this doctrinal uncertainty, one recent 
study found that “lower courts have been very reluctant to establish 
quantitative cutoffs for what is, or is not, legally significant minority 
cohesion.”44  
In addition, “the race of the candidate per se is irrelevant to racial 
bloc voting analysis.”45 A White politician can be the candidate of 
choice of minorities and, conversely, a minority candidate is not 
necessarily the minority community’s candidate of choice. To cite one 
prominent example from the case law: Henry Bonilla, a Hispanic 
Republican Congressman from Texas, was not the candidate of choice 
for Hispanics living in his district.46 
For litigation purposes, racially polarized voting is usually 
demonstrated “through the use of bivariate statistical analyses such as 
. . . ecological regression, instead of multiple regression analyses that 
try to control for the influence of nonracial factors.”47 Put simply, racial 
bloc voting is established using statistical methods that look for 
correlation, not causation.48 That is because most courts do not require 
plaintiffs to prove the underlying causes of racially polarized voting.49  
Although disentangling these causal factors is outside the scope of 
this Article,50 racial bloc voting has numerous potential causes.51 These 
include racist sentiments among White voters,52 in-group favoritism 
 
 43. Id. 
 44. Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 8, at 611. 
 45. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 67 (plurality opinion). 
 46. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 428 (2006). 
 47. John M. Powers, Note, Statistical Evidence of Racially Polarized Voting in the Obama 
Elections, and Implications for Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 102 GEO. L.J. 881, 889 (2014).  
 48. See id. 
 49. See id.; see also infra notes 108–13 and accompanying text. 
 50. Also outside the scope of this Article is the so-called “race or party” question: When a 
law disproportionately impacts both minorities and a particular political party in a jurisdiction 
with racial bloc voting, how should a court determine whether race or party motivated the law’s 
enactment? See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three 
Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1837, 1840–41 (2018) [hereinafter Hasen, Race or Party].  
 51. See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 27, at 1229 (observing that “present-day racial bloc 
voting may itself be the product of past de jure race discrimination”). 
 52. See, e.g., Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial 
Stereotyping: Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance After Shelby County, 102 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1123, 1127 (2014) [hereinafter Elmendorf & Spencer, Racial Stereotyping] (“[O]ur 
ranking of states by anti-black stereotyping correlates very highly—but not perfectly—with 
rankings based on black population share and racially polarizing voting in the 2008 presidential 
election.”). 
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within minority groups,53 as well as stark racial divides in important 
indicators like socioeconomic status,54 educational attainment,55 and 
incarceration rates.56 The decades-long exodus of socially conservative 
White southerners from the Democratic Party is also frequently 
identified as a major factor in contemporary racially polarized voting.57 
Racial bloc voting remains an undeniable feature of political life in 
twenty-first century America. 
B. Racially Polarized Voting Today 
Despite “[t]he historic accomplishments of the Voting Rights 
Act,”58 “racially polarized voting [is] not ancient history.”59 Indeed, 
racially polarized voting is well-known to even a casual political 
observer. Any cable news show recapping an election will focus on the 
intersection of race, geography, and partisanship in predicting and 
reporting election results. The fact that Black voters almost uniformly 
support Democrats and that White southerners tend to vote for 
Republicans is a political truism—entire campaigns are built around 
this principle.60 
This political truism is borne out by the data. Consider the most 
recent presidential election. In 2016, White voters backed Donald 
 
 53. See, e.g., Tasha S. Philpot & Hanes Walton, Jr., One of Our Own: Black Female 
Candidates and the Voters Who Support Them, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 49, 50 (2007) (“Black voting 
behavior, especially as it relates to support for black candidates, is thought to be a function of a 
sense of group identification. . . . Consequently, research has found that blacks in particular use 
what happens to the group as a proxy for individual self-interests.”). 
 54. See, e.g., Courtney E. Martin, Opinion, Closing the Racial Wealth Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
23, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2W3AE66 [https://perma.cc/7M8P-AQHY] (“The median white family 
has 41 times more wealth than the median African-American family . . . .”). 
 55. See, e.g., Schuette v. Coal. to Def. Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 334 (2014) (Breyer, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (“[L]ow educational achievement continues to be correlated with 
income and race.”). 
 56. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 7 (2012) (“In some states, black men have been admitted to prison on 
drug charges at rates twenty to fifty times greater than those of white men.”). 
 57. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain & Emily R. Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and 
Voting Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 875 (2016). 
 58. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201 (2009). 
 59. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25 (2009) (plurality opinion). 
 60. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1537, 1554–55 (2004) (discussing Nixon’s Southern Strategy to appeal to White 
southerners disaffected with busing, desegregation, and the civil rights movement). 
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Trump over Hillary Clinton by a 21-point margin,61 and Black voters 
preferred Clinton by an 80-point margin.62 Or take the 2008 election. 
Although the election of Barack Obama, the United States’ first Black 
president, is frequently celebrated as a post-racial moment, “racial 
polarization . . . actually increased in the 2008 election.”63 
These examples are not outliers. In fact, since the passage of the 
VRA in 1965, Republicans have won at least a plurality of the White 
vote and Democrats have overwhelmingly won the Black vote in every 
presidential election.64 These election results, therefore, reflect racial 
divisions that are long-standing—and worsening. As Professor Nick 
Stephanopoulos recently found, Black–White polarization “gradual[ly] 
declin[ed] from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s and [it has] slow[ly] 
ascen[ded] ever since.”65  
Unsurprisingly then, racial polarization runs deeper than 
presidential politics. Racial bloc voting occurs in legislative elections at 
the federal, state, and local level.66 The existence of racially polarized 
voting in these elections is especially relevant because Section 2 
litigation has historically challenged the drawing of districts.67  
 
 61. Alec Tyson & Shiva Maniam, Behind Trump’s Victory: Divisions by Race, Gender, 
Education, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/09/
behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education [https://perma.cc/KYN6-RHHP]. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Regional Differences in 
Racial Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 205, 205 (2013) (emphasis added). Before 
the 2008 general election, Obama benefited from significant cohesion among Black voters in the 
Democratic primaries. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 47, at 909. 
 64. See Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Race, Region, and 
Vote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 1385, 1401 (2010) [hereinafter Ansolabehere et al., 2008 Election] (examining racial 
voting patterns in the 1968 through 2008 elections); Powers, supra note 47, at 883 (2012 election); 
Tyson & Maniam, supra note 61 (2016 election).  
 65. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, supra note 1, at 1349. 
 66. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 33, at 756–70 tbl.B (compiling 
cases where the Gingles factors were satisfied). 
 67. See Ansolabehere et al., 2008 Election, supra note 64, at 1391. In the past decade, there 
has been an increase in vote denial cases brought under Section 2 as states have enacted 
discriminatory voter-suppression laws. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 
2018) (upholding Texas’s revised voter ID law); N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 
F.3d 204, 242 (4th Cir. 2016) (invalidating North Carolina’s post-Shelby County voter-suppression 
law). For recent academic discussions of Section 2’s application to vote denial claims, see 
generally Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial 
Claims, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 763 (2016); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, Unified Law, 
128 YALE L.J. 1566 (2019) [hereinafter Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact]; Daniel P. Tokaji, 
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Moreover, several studies have found that racism and racially 
polarized voting are worse in the Southern States.68 These findings are 
borne out in judicial decisions. In Professor Ellen Katz’s famous survey 
of Section 2 decisions, courts found racially polarized voting in 105 
cases between 1982 and 2006.69 Half of these suits were in jurisdictions 
then covered by Section 5 of the VRA, where only a quarter of the 
nation’s population resides.70 Given that racially polarized voting is a 
precondition for liability under Section 2 and that the covered 
jurisdictions were mostly in the Deep South, these decisions support 
the conclusion that racially polarized voting remains higher in the 
South than in the rest of the country.71  
Thus, over fifty years after the passage of the VRA, discriminatory 
barriers to vote have fallen, but racially polarized voting persists.  
 
Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439 (2015); and Daniel 
P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. 
REV. 689 (2006). 
 68. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 34 (2006) (noting that “the degree of racially 
polarized voting in the South is increasing, not decreasing”); Elmendorf & Spencer, Racial 
Stereotyping, supra note 52, at 1127 (finding that “the recently invalidated coverage formula 
actually did a remarkably good job of picking out states whose non-black residents harbor 
exceptionally negative stereotypes of African Americans”); Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and 
Power, supra note 1, at 1349 (“Between 1972 and 2012, I find that black-white polarization was 
higher in the South than in the non-South . . . .”). 
 69. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 33, at 665. 
 70. See id. at 655, 665. Section 5 required certain covered jurisdictions—largely in the 
South—to preclear all voting changes with federal authorities. In 2006, Congress reauthorized 
Section 4(b)’s coverage formula for determining which jurisdictions were subject to Section 5’s 
preclearance requirement. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 537–39 (2013). The Shelby 
County Court invalidated Section 4(b)’s coverage formula for violating the equal sovereignty 
principle but “issue[d] no holding on § 5 itself.” Id. at 557. 
 71. Voting is also racially polarized between White people and other minority groups, 
though to a lesser extent than between White and Black voters. See LAUGHLIN MCDONALD, 
AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUAL VOTING RIGHTS 263 (2010) (attributing Native 
American support for Democratic victories in the 2002 South Dakota Senate race, the 2004 
Montana gubernatorial race, and the 2006 Montana Senate race); Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, 
and Power, supra note 1, at 1357 (“Turning to Hispanic-white polarization, it was markedly lower 
than black-white polarization from 1972 to 2012. It drifted around 25% in the average state, 
compared to a black-white polarization mean of roughly 50%.”); Hansi Lo Wang, Trump Lost 
More of the Asian-American Vote than the National Exit Polls Showed, NPR (Apr. 18, 2017, 2:19 
PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/18/524371847/trump-lost-more-of-the-asian-american-vote-
than-the-national-exit-polls-showed [https://perma.cc/BZA2-EA4N] (estimating that Clinton 
won between 65 percent to 79 percent of the Asian American vote). 
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C. Racial Vote Dilution Under the Constitution and the VRA 
Vote dilution claims can be brought under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA, though the latter is the driving 
force of most voting rights litigation. Constitutional and statutory vote 
dilution claims require different types of proof because they target 
distinct dilutive schemes. Both inquiries look at the totality of the 
circumstances to determine whether minorities have an opportunity to 
elect their candidates of choice. But a constitutional vote dilution claim 
requires a showing of invidious intent whereas Section 2 does not. 
Furthermore, the Court’s adoption of the Gingles factors has shifted 
the vote dilution inquiry away from a totality-of-the-circumstances 
inquiry and moved a showing of racial bloc voting to center stage. The 
upshot is that Section 2 mandates the creation of majority-minority 
districts when a significant number of minorities are residentially 
segregated and voting is racially polarized.  
This Section discusses vote dilution claims under the Constitution 
and Section 2 of the VRA as well as the themes that emerge from the 
doctrine’s development.  
1. The Development of the Doctrine.  Notwithstanding the history 
recounted below,72 the Court has interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment to largely subsume the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
protections against racial discrimination in voting.73 Indeed, the Court 
has repeatedly declined to decide whether vote dilution claims are 
cognizable under the Fifteenth Amendment.74 The Court, however, has 
recognized racial vote dilution claims under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
The Court first invoked the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate 
a redistricting scheme on racial vote dilution grounds in its 1973 
 
 72. See infra Part III. 
 73. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 
EMORY L.J. 1397, 1424 (2002) (“[T]he Fifteenth Amendment’s requirement of equal voting rights 
often appears to go no further than the protection now afforded by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1557–64 (canvassing how the Court’s 
current doctrine conflates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). 
 74. See Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 334 n.3 (2000) (“[W]e 
have never held that vote dilution violates the Fifteenth Amendment.”); Voinovich v. Quilter, 
507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993) (“This Court has not decided whether the Fifteenth Amendment applies 
to vote-dilution claims.”); Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 142 n.14 (1976) (“There is no 
decision in this Court holding a legislative apportionment or reapportionment violative of the 
Fifteenth Amendment.”). 
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decision in White v. Regester.75 According to the Court, plaintiffs 
bringing vote dilution claims must show that “the political processes 
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to 
participation by the group in question—that its members had less 
opportunity . . . to participate in the political processes and to elect 
legislators of their choice.”76 In so holding, the Court expressly rejected 
the notion that minorities are entitled to proportional representation.77 
Instead, the Court adopted a “totality of the circumstances”78 standard 
and identified a variety of relevant factors. These included the number 
of minorities elected to office, the jurisdiction’s history of racial 
discrimination in voting, racial inequities in several socioeconomic 
indicators, racial campaign tactics, discriminatory candidate slating, the 
use of numbered posts in at-large elections, and legislators’ 
responsiveness to the minority community’s concerns.79 Most 
importantly for present purposes, the White Court also identified 
racially polarized voting as a relevant factor.80  
Although White heralded a new era of racial vote dilution claims 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, developments in the 1980s resulted 
in such claims being brought under the VRA. In City of Mobile v. 
Bolden,81 a plurality of the Court concluded that plaintiffs must prove 
discriminatory intent to establish a racial vote dilution claim under the 
Fourteenth Amendment,82 a point a majority of the Court later 
 
 75. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–69 (1973); see also James U. Blacksher & Larry T. 
Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs 
Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 22 (1982) (noting White’s 
unprecedented holding). Although White was the first case where the Court struck down a plan 
on racial vote dilution grounds, the Court had left open the possibility in Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 
U.S. 124, 141–44 (1971). 
 76. White, 412 U.S. at 766. 
 77. See id. at 765–66 (“To sustain such claims, it is not enough that the racial group allegedly 
discriminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential.”). 
 78. Id. at 769. 
 79. See id. at 766–69. 
 80. The Court did not use the magic words “racially polarized voting” or “racial bloc voting,” 
but the point is clear. See id. at 766–67 (explaining that the “white-dominated” Democratic Party 
in Dallas County “did not need the support of the Negro community to win elections in the 
county”); id. at 767 (describing “racial campaign tactics in white precincts to defeat candidates 
who had the overwhelming support of the black community” (quoting Graves v. Barnes, 343 F. 
Supp. 704, 726–27 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (per curiam))). 
 81. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 82. See id. at 66–67 (plurality opinion). 
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confirmed in Rogers v. Lodge.83 On this front, the Court’s approach 
mirrored a broader turn in equal protection jurisprudence toward an 
intent requirement.84  
In addition, the Bolden plurality determined that the Fifteenth 
Amendment, like the Fourteenth, has an intent requirement.85 The 
Bolden plurality, however, determined that the Fifteenth Amendment 
does not encompass vote dilution claims.86 And because Section 2 of 
the VRA “no more than elaborate[d] upon . . . the Fifteenth 
Amendment,”87 the Bolden plurality reasoned that the two were 
coextensive.88 
After Bolden, “a good deal of voting rights litigation ground to a 
halt.”89 Concerned about Bolden’s dramatic impact,90 Congress revised 
Section 2 in 1982 to eliminate the intent requirement and to authorize 
vote dilution claims.91 In recognizing a discriminatory effects claim, 
Congress relied on its Reconstruction Amendment enforcement 
authority to enact prophylactic legislation.92 
 
 83. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982). 
 84. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 66 (plurality opinion) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 
248 (1976)); Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 21, at 1845 (arguing that Bolden “recast 
voting rights claims in the mold of Washington v. Davis”). But see Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of 
Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1127–28 (1989) (arguing that the intent analysis 
employed in racial vote dilution cases differs from civil rights cases). 
 85. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion). 
 86. See id. at 65. Although Rogers transformed Bolden’s conclusion on the Fourteenth 
Amendment into a holding, the Rogers Court “express[ed] no view on the application of the 
Fifteenth Amendment to th[e] case.” Rogers, 458 U.S. at 619 n.6. 
 87. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 60 (plurality opinion). 
 88. See id. at 60–61. 
 89. Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
7 (2008). 
 90. Bolden’s timing was propitious for defenders of minority voting rights. The VRA’s 
coverage formula and Section 5 were set to expire in 1982, and Congress used that opportunity to 
amend Section 2. See id. at 7 n.22. 
 91. See id. at 7–8 (discussing Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 
§ 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134)); see also 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018) (prohibiting election laws that “result[] 
in a denial or abridgment of [the] right . . . to vote on account of race”). 
 92. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 383–84 (1991) (“In 1982, Congress amended § 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act to make clear that certain practices and procedures that result in the denial 
or abridgment of the right to vote are forbidden even though the absence of proof of 
discriminatory intent protects them from constitutional challenge.” (footnote omitted)); Michael 
T. Morley, Prophylactic Redistricting? Congress’s Section 5 Power and the New Equal Protection 
Right to Vote, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2053, 2072–74 (2018) (discussing how the VRA is an 
exercise of Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority); see also Nev. Dep’t 
of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2003) (“Congress may enact so-called prophylactic 
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The 1982 amendments to Section 2 clearly borrowed from White’s 
approach. Echoing White, Section 2’s text refers to a “totality of [the] 
circumstances” standard that examines whether minorities “have less 
opportunity . . . to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice.”93 Like White, Section 2 identifies as a 
relevant factor “[t]he extent to which members of a protected class 
have been elected to office.”94 The accompanying Senate Report lists 
several additional factors drawn from White, including racially 
polarized voting.95 And, following White, Section 2’s text disavows a 
proportionality standard.96  
But the resurrection of White’s totality-of-the-circumstances 
standard proved fleeting. In its 1986 decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, 
the Court announced three “necessary preconditions” for statutory 
vote dilution claims.97 First, the minority group must be “sufficiently 
large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-
member district.”98 Second, the minority group must be “politically 
cohesive.”99 And third, White bloc voting must “usually . . . defeat the 
minority’s preferred candidate.”100 Although technically three factors, 
 
legislation that proscribes facially constitutional conduct, in order to prevent and deter 
unconstitutional conduct.”). Parsing the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress did not need to 
rely on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority to prohibit intentionally discriminatory 
vote dilution. However, Congress arguably relied on its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement 
authority to the extent that those claims have not yet been recognized under that Amendment. 
For more on this point, see infra notes 204–05 and accompanying text. 
 93. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982); see also Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized 
Voting, supra note 8, at 597 (commenting that the Senate Report borrowed factors “from the 
constitutional vote dilution jurisprudence of the 1970s”); Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 
21, at 1848 (“The legislative history of the 1982 amendments introduces the formal recognition of 
racially polarized voting patterns as a crucial ingredient of a vote dilution claim.”). The Senate 
Report also drew from Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc), a leading 
pre-Bolden case. 
 96. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (“[N]othing in this section establishes a right to have members of a 
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.”). 
 97. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 51. 
 100. Id. The Gingles Court borrowed this test from an article written by two prominent voting 
rights attorneys. See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 75, at 50–64 (proposing the soon-to-be 
Gingles factors); Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 8, at 597 (crediting 
Blacksher and Menefee with developing the Gingles factors).  
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Gingles boils down to whether a minority group is residentially 
segregated and whether there is racially polarized voting.101  
By focusing on residential segregation, the Gingles Court 
reinforced the relationship between geography and representation.102 
Put simply, “[t]he more residentially segregated a minority group is, 
the more geographically compact the group is too, and so the easier it 
should be for the group to satisfy Gingles’s first prong.”103 The 
compactness requirement also bolsters Section 2’s manageability and 
constitutionality by narrowing the statute’s scope. Without the 
compactness inquiry, courts could be forced to draw bizarrely shaped 
or geographically expansive districts or to accommodate minority 
groups with miniscule populations.104 And in the long run, as residential 
segregation (hopefully) decreases,105 minorities will find it harder to 
satisfy Gingles’s first prong, since it becomes more difficult to draw a 
compact single-member district.106 
 
 101. See Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, supra note 1, at 1327. 
 102. See Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1706 (“[T]he compactness requirement in 
Gingles does not necessarily stem from the nature of the injury itself.”). 
This linkage between geography and representation is not preordained, as demonstrated 
by the California Voting Rights Act (“CVRA”), CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 14025–14032 (West. 2020). 
Unlike its federal counterpart, the CVRA “does not require that the plaintiff prove a ‘compact 
majority–minority’ district is possible for liability purposes,” though it does take that fact into 
account “in developing a remedy.” Jauregui v. City of Palmdale, 226 Cal. App. 4th 781, 789 (2014) 
(quoting Sanchez v. City of Modesto, 145 Cal. App. 4th 660, 669 (2006)); see also Kareem U. 
Crayton, Reinventing Voting Rights Preclearance, 44 IND. L. REV. 201, 239–40 (2010) (observing 
that the CVRA “entitles groups to sue even when they are too geographically dispersed to elect 
a candidate of choice from a single member district in a county”). The upshot is that the CVRA 
imposes a “lower standard” than the federal VRA. Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff, 
Preempting Politics: State Power and Local Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1383 (2020). 
 103. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, supra note 1, at 1365. 
 104. See id. at 1338; Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1708. If the Shaw cause of action 
had stayed tied to a bizarreness inquiry, the compactness requirement may have helped reconcile 
the two doctrines, since a compact district would be unlikely to trigger strict scrutiny. See Shaw v. 
Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (observing that “reapportionment is one area in which 
appearances do matter”); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 915 (1995) (abandoning 
bizarreness as the touchstone); id. at 920 (adopting the predominance standard). 
 105. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 546 
(2015) (noting that “many cities have become more diverse” since the 1960s); Nicholas O. 
Stephanopoulos, Civil Rights in a Desegregating America, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1339 (2016) 
(“Black-white segregation has declined sharply since 1970.”).  
 106. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and 
Remedies After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 741 (1998) [hereinafter Karlan, Two Section 
Twos]. 
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The second and third Gingles factors are essentially an inquiry into 
whether voting is racially polarized.107 But despite its importance under 
Section 2, there are still several open questions about what constitutes 
legally significant racial bloc voting. 
The Gingles Court, for example, failed to reach consensus on the 
relevance of causation to the polarization inquiry. Under Justice 
Brennan’s plurality opinion, the inquiry into racial bloc voting focuses 
on correlation—not causation.108 According to Justice Brennan, courts 
need not examine the underlying causes of racially polarized voting 
because “the reasons black and white voters vote differently have no 
relevance” under Section 2’s discriminatory effects standard.109 After 
all, Brennan reasoned, the “critical question” under Section 2 is 
whether the challenged practice “results in members of a protected 
group having less opportunity . . . to participate in the political process 
and to elect representatives of their choice.”110 By contrast, in her 
concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor argued that courts should 
examine the reasons for racial bloc voting.111 As O’Connor put it, “[i]n 
a community that is polarized along racial lines, racial hostility may bar 
. . . indirect avenues of political influence to a much greater extent than 
in a community where racial animosity is absent although the interests 
of racial groups diverge.”112 This causation question remains open, and 
the circuits are split on it.113 
And although there is no magic ratio for racial bloc voting under 
Gingles,114 the Supreme Court has hinted at imposing strict quantitative 
cutoffs for racial bloc voting. In so doing, it has indicated that the 
Gingles factors are not hermetically sealed. In Bartlett v. Strickland,115 
 
 107. See Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination, supra note 33, at 664 (“[C]ourts that 
consider racial bloc voting generally engage in one inquiry.”). 
 108. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 63 (1986) (plurality opinion) (stating that the 
touchstone is the “correlation between race of voter and the selection of certain candidates”). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. (emphasis added). 
 111. See id. at 100 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I believe Congress also 
intended that explanations of the reasons why white voters rejected minority candidates would 
be probative of the likelihood that candidates elected without decisive minority support would be 
willing to take the minority’s interests into account.”). 
 112. Id. 
 113. See Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 8, at 614–15 (explaining that 
the First and Fifth Circuits require a showing of causation whereas other circuits do not). 
 114. See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text. 
 115. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009). 
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the Court considered a question left open by Gingles: whether Section 
2 requires the creation of a so-called crossover district, “one in which 
minority voters make up less than a majority of the voting-age 
population” but are still large enough to elect their candidate of choice 
with White crossover voters.116 Because the State in Bartlett had 
conceded the third Gingles factor, the Court could not resolve the case 
on those grounds.117 Nonetheless, the plurality stated that it was 
“skeptical that the bloc-voting test could be satisfied . . . where 
minority voters . . . cannot elect their candidate of choice without 
support from almost 20 percent of white voters.”118 The plurality then 
concluded that Gingles’s first prong is satisfied only when a minority 
group constitutes a majority in a single-member district.119 Thus, just as 
Gingles acknowledged that “the percentage of registered voters in the 
district who are . . . minorit[ies]”120 could impact the legally significant 
ratio of racial bloc voting, the obverse is also true. The level of racially 
polarized voting informed the scope of the compactness requirement, 
resulting in a bright-line cutoff. 
The Gingles factors do not end the doctrinal analysis. The Gingles 
factors were developed in a case challenging multimember districts.121 
However, in the early 1990s, the Court started applying the Gingles 
factors to single-member redistricting plans.122 But simply applying the 
Gingles factors to this new context raised its own questions. As 
Professor Heather Gerken explains, “[t]he problem with extending 
Gingles [to single-member districts] is that there is no clear baseline for 
 
 116. Id. at 13 (plurality opinion); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46 n.12 (reserving judgment on 
this point); Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1119 (2005) 
[hereinafter Gerken, Second-Order] (defining a crossover or coalition district as one “with a 
thirty-three to thirty-nine percent population of voters of color”). The Court had previously held 
that so-called influence districts—where “a minority group can influence the outcome of an 
election even if its preferred candidate cannot be elected”—were not required by Section 2. 
Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 13 (plurality opinion) (citing League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry 
(LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 445 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)). 
 117. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion) (noting concession).  
 118. Id.; see also id. at 24 (“In areas with substantial crossover voting it is unlikely that the 
plaintiffs would be able to establish the third Gingles precondition . . . .”); Elmendorf et al., 
Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 8, at 602 (discussing oral argument in Bartlett and remarking 
that “at least five justices were open to the idea of numeric cutoffs for group cohesion”). 
 119. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 26 (plurality opinion). 
 120. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56. 
 121. See id. at 34. 
 122. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993). 
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determining how many additional majority-minority districts a state 
can fairly be expected to create under § 2.”123 
The Court sought to resolve that dilemma in Johnson v. De 
Grandy.124 There, the Court made clear that the Gingles factors are 
necessary but not sufficient to establish a vote dilution claim under 
Section 2.125 The De Grandy Court reinvigorated the totality-of-the-
circumstances inquiry and the opportunity-to-elect standard—but with 
a twist. Despite Section 2’s textual disavowal of a right to 
proportionality, the Court focused extensively on whether the number 
of majority-minority districts was “roughly proportional to the 
minority voters’ respective shares in the voting-age population.”126 
Although disclaiming the creation of a “safe harbor,”127 the Court 
nevertheless gave proportionality priority within the totality-of-the-
circumstances inquiry.128  
Today, the Gingles factors—as supplemented by De Grandy—
continue to govern vote dilution litigation, and Section 2 is the driving 
force for vote dilution claims. Indeed, after Gingles, constitutional vote 
dilution claims are rare.129 This development is unsurprising given that 
it is far easier for plaintiffs to prove discriminatory effects under 
Section 2 than discriminatory intent,130 and courts are reluctant to reach 
a constitutional question when a case can be resolved on statutory 
 
 123. Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1675 (emphasis added). 
 124. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994). 
 125. See id. at 1011 (“But if Gingles so clearly identified the three as generally necessary to 
prove a § 2 claim, it just as clearly declined to hold them sufficient in combination . . . .”). 
 126. Id. at 1000 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1024 (“[T]he totality of circumstances appears 
not to support a finding of vote dilution here, where both minority groups constitute effective 
voting majorities in a number of . . . districts substantially proportional to their share in the 
population . . . .”). 
 127. Id. at 1018; see also id. at 1020–21 (“No single statistic provides courts with a shortcut to 
determine whether a set of single-member districts unlawfully dilutes minority voting strength.”). 
 128. See Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1676 (explaining that, since De Grandy, 
proportionality “has become the preeminent measure of fairness in redistricting”). This 
development is likely due to the fact that “[a]n antidiscrimination results test necessarily 
presupposes some benchmark conception of neutrality or fairness against which an allegedly 
discriminatory result may be measured,” Elmendorf, Biased Votes, supra note 38, at 390, and 
proportionality provided a manageable standard for single-member redistricting plans. 
 129. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE 
L.J. 174, 201–02 (2007). 
 130. See Karlan, Two Section Twos, supra note 106, at 735; cf. Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 
113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 539 (2018) (“Judges are wary of accusing discriminators of bigotry.”). 
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grounds.131 But in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s invalidation of 
the VRA’s coverage formula in Shelby County v. Holder,132 plaintiffs 
have started bringing constitutional claims.  
This is because plaintiffs are now requesting bail-in relief under 
Section 3(c) of the VRA. Pursuant to the bail-in provision, courts may 
require states and political subdivisions that have violated the 
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to preclear all voting changes 
with federal authorities.133 Section 3(c)’s constitutional trigger for 
coverage means that plaintiffs must go above and beyond a 
discriminatory effects claim and prove discriminatory intent.134 
Although the most high-profile decisions have not ordered bail-in,135 a 
district court recently concluded that the city of Pasadena, Texas, 
engaged in intentionally discriminatory vote dilution and ordered bail-
in.136 And even though it declined to order bail-in,137 the Fourth Circuit 
invalidated North Carolina’s post-Shelby County voter-suppression 
law on intentional discrimination grounds rather than reach Section 2’s 
application to vote-denial claims.138 Thus, even though Section 2 
 
 131. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006) 
(invalidating congressional district as violative of Section 2 while observing that Texas’s actions 
bore “the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal protection 
violation”); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the 
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”). 
 132. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). 
 133. 52 U.S.C. § 10302(c) (2018). Put simply, Section 3(c) is an alternative means of imposing 
preclearance. See Travis Crum, Note, The Voting Rights Act’s Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger 
Litigation and Dynamic Preclearance, 119 YALE L.J. 1992, 2006–09 (2010) [hereinafter Crum, 
Pocket Trigger]. 
 134. See Crum, Pocket Trigger, supra note 133, at 2009. 
 135. See Veasey v. Abbott, 888 F.3d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that Texas’s revised 
voter ID law meant that “there is no equitable basis for subjecting Texas to ongoing federal 
election scrutiny under Section 3(c)”); N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 
241–42 (4th Cir. 2016) (declining to bail-in North Carolina notwithstanding a finding of 
intentional discrimination); Perez v. Abbott, 390 F. Supp. 3d 803, 807 (W.D. Tex. 2019) (finding 
intentional discrimination in enactment of redistricting plan but declining request for Section 3(c) 
relief); see also Travis Crum, The Prospect of Bailing-in Texas: Recent Bail-in Litigation, 
ELECTION L. BLOG (Sept. 14, 2018, 9:39 AM) [hereinafter Crum, Recent Bail-in Litigation], 
https://electionlawblog.org/?p=101137 [https://perma.cc/EYE5-TL68] (surveying cases). 
 136. See Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 729–30 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (ordering 
bail-in of city in Texas); see also Allen v. City of Evergreen, No. 13-0107-CG-M, 2014 WL 
12607819, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 13, 2014) (granting consent decree bailing-in city in Alabama). 
 137. See McCrory, 831 F.3d at 241–42. 
 138. See id. at 215; see also Michael J. Pitts, Rethinking Section 2 Vote Denial, 46 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1, 21 n.85 (2018) (discussing McCrory’s discriminatory intent holding and commenting 
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remains the primary defender of minority voting rights, there may be a 
resurgence of constitutional vote dilution litigation in the coming 
years.139 
2. Themes from Racial Vote Dilution Doctrine.  A few themes 
emerge from this history. First, racially polarized voting has always 
been a factor for adjudicating constitutional and statutory racial vote 
dilution claims. Undoubtedly, racially polarized voting features more 
prominently in statutory cases than constitutional ones. It is but one of 
many factors for a constitutional vote dilution claim under White’s 
totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry. By contrast, racial bloc voting 
serves a gatekeeping function for a statutory claim. Indeed, “Gingles 
brought the racially polarized voting inquiry into the undisputed and 
unchallenged center of the Voting Rights Act.”140  
Second, constitutional vote dilution doctrine is underdeveloped. 
In fact, White is one of the only decisions where the Court has 
invalidated a districting scheme on constitutional vote dilution 
grounds.141 The Court, moreover, has repeatedly punted on whether 
the Fifteenth Amendment applies to vote dilution claims.142 As 
discussed more below,143 the scope and source of constitutional vote 
dilution claims is not trivial and will matter in the inevitable 
constitutional challenge to Section 2. 
Third, although both constitutional and statutory vote dilution 
doctrines look ultimately to whether minorities have an opportunity to 
 
that it was “odd given that one would think that reversing the trial court on its discriminatory-
results analysis would be easier than on its discriminatory-purpose analysis”); Crum, Recent Bail-
in Litigation, supra note 135 (“[T]he Fourth Circuit . . . avoided a contentious legal question—the 
appropriate standard under Section 2 for showing discriminatory effects in vote-denial 
litigation—by making an inherently fact-bound discriminatory-intent finding.”). 
 139. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, RICHARD H. PILDES & NATHANIEL 
PERSILY, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 644 (5th 
ed. 2016) (observing that plaintiffs rarely pressed constitutional claims after the 1982 amendments 
but predicting that such claims will increase post-Shelby County because of Section 3(c)).  
 140. Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 21, at 1851. 
 141. The Court also struck down an at-large plan on constitutional vote dilution grounds in 
Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 628 (1982). There, it emphasized that “[t]he minority’s voting 
power in a multimember district is particularly diluted when bloc voting occurs and ballots are 
cast along strict majority-minority lines.” Id. at 616; see also Luke P. McLoughlin, Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act and City of Boerne: The Continuity, Proximity, and Trajectory of Vote-Dilution 
Standards, 31 VT. L. REV. 39, 46 (2006) (noting that “the Court [has] decided no claims of 
unconstitutional minority vote dilution after its opaque decision in Rogers v. Lodge in 1982”). 
 142. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 143. See infra Parts II.C & IV.B.3. 
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elect their candidate of choice, the Gingles factors are widely viewed 
as bringing much-needed order to vote dilution litigation. Even at the 
time, White’s totality-of-the-circumstances standard was 
controversial—including among voting rights attorneys—for failing to 
provide a predictable and workable rule.144 As Professor Sam 
Issacharoff observes, “the best that White/Zimmer could muster was 
the need to examine the ‘totality of the circumstances,’ an inquiry as 
empty as the resigned ‘I know it when I see it’ approach to obscenity 
under the First Amendment.”145 The Gingles factors provided an easily 
administrable means of implementing Section 2’s opportunity-to-elect 
standard.146  
Fourth, Section 2 prohibits a wider swath of dilutive schemes than 
the Fourteenth Amendment. As noted, Congress relied on its 
enforcement authority in adopting a discriminatory effects standard 
and thereby dispensing with the Equal Protection Clause’s intent 
requirement.147 To be clear, Section 2’s discriminatory effects standard 
is not entirely decoupled from a showing of intent. As in other areas of 
anti-discrimination law,148 Section 2’s discriminatory effects standard is 
designed to ferret out ways in which a particular electoral practice 
“interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in 
the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their 
 
 144. See Blacksher & Menefee, supra note 75, at 22 (criticizing White for “not articulat[ing] 
uniform, manageable standards for determining when dilution violates the equal protection 
clause” and for “largely recapitulat[ing] the district court’s factual findings”); Stephanopoulos, 
Race, Place, and Power, supra note 1, at 1333 (“The conventional wisdom is that vote dilution 
doctrine was formless mush before Gingles, rendering it arbitrary whether electoral arrangements 
were struck down or upheld.”). 
 145. Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 21, at 1845. 
 146. See Justin Driver, Rethinking the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 
186 (2011) (arguing that Gingles created a “manageable, three-part test for proving vote 
dilution”); Dale E. Ho, Something Old, Something New, or Something Really Old? Second 
Generation Racial Gerrymandering Litigation as Intentional Racial Discrimination Cases, 59 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1887, 1915 (2018) (arguing that the Gingles preconditions were “intended to 
create a judicially manageable standard for (and limit the reach of) a statutory claim for 
discriminatory results”); Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social 
Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1549 n.93 (2002) (discussing Gingles’s 
“reduction of the complex statutory conception of vote dilution into a far more manageable three-
prong test”). 
 147. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 148. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 
519, 521 (2015) (“Recognition of disparate-impact liability under the [Fair Housing Act] plays an 
important role in uncovering discriminatory intent: it permits plaintiffs to counteract unconscious 
prejudices and disguised animus that escape easy classification as disparate treatment.”). 
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preferred representatives.”149 The Gingles preconditions and the 
Senate Factors borrowed from White and Zimmer v. McKeithen150 
examine how present and past discrimination impact the electoral 
opportunities of minority voters.151 But regardless of the exactness of 
the fit between the statutory standard and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Congress relied on its enforcement authority to enact 
Section 2’s discriminatory effects standard.152 
Fifth, vote dilution litigation has profoundly impacted our nation’s 
politics. Many early vote dilution cases were challenges to 
multimember or at-large districts.153 These suits were incredibly 
effective at dismantling these districts.154 As a result of this litigation 
and Gingles’s application to single-member districts,155 the number of 
Black representatives has increased dramatically over the past few 
decades.156 
Finally, by making racially polarized voting a threshold 
requirement to a statutory vote dilution claim, the Gingles Court 
 
 149. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986); see also Stephanopoulos, Disparate Impact, 
supra note 67, at 1566–67 (arguing that Section 2 should be construed consistently with other 
disparate impact provisions). 
 150. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc). 
 151. Id. at 1305–06; see supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 152. The closeness of that fit and how the discriminatory effects standard is conceptualized 
will matter for the inevitable constitutional challenge to Section 2. See Gerken, Undiluted Vote, 
supra note 5, at 1674; see also infra notes 212–20 and accompanying text (explaining the 
congruence and proportionality test from City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)). 
 153. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34; Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 614 (1982); City of Mobile v. 
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 58 (1980) (plurality opinion); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973); 
see also Elmendorf et al., Racially Polarized Voting, supra note 8, at 596 (noting that “[n]early all 
of the [constitutional vote dilution] cases concerned at-large elections”).  
 154. See Cox & Miles, supra note 89, at 15 (finding that challenges to multimember districts 
were over half of all Section 2 cases until the 2000s); Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional 
Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 45, 48 (“With the 1982 Amendments to the 
Voting Rights Act, Congress ushered in a decade-long period in which multimember and at-large 
electoral arrangements ceded to minority-controlled single-member districts.”). The Dillard 
lawsuit is the most dramatic example of second-generation litigation. There, over 160 county- and 
city-level bodies were reorganized into single-member districts. See Dillard v. Baldwin Cty. Bd. 
of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (M.D. Ala. 1988) (Thompson, J.) (discussing the history of these 
cases); Pamela S. Karlan, The Alabama Foundations of the Law of Democracy¸ 67 ALA. L. REV. 
415, 430 (2015) (describing Dillard as the “most transformative single section 2 lawsuit”). 
 155. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40–41 (1993). 
 156. See Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, supra note 1, at 1395 (“In the average 
southern state, the share of black state house members has jumped from about 13% before 
[Gingles] to roughly 20% today. In the average nonsouthern state with a sizeable black 
population, this proportion has grown from around 9% to close to 14%.” (footnote omitted)). 
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fashioned a de facto sunset date for Section 2. In seeking to reinforce 
Section 2 against an inevitable constitutional attack, several scholars 
emphasize that minority plaintiffs will no longer be able to bring 
Section 2 claims as the level of racially polarized voting decreases.157 It 
may seem counterintuitive to argue that a statute’s future obsolescence 
bolsters its constitutionality. However, this argument dovetails with the 
doctrinal point that statutes enacted pursuant to Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority are more likely to be 
upheld if they have termination dates.158 This insight also appeals to the 
Court’s intuition that it is the institution best situated to move our 
nation toward the “goal of a political system in which race no longer 
matters—a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire.”159 
II.  RACIAL VOTE DILUTION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
There are several criticisms of vote dilution doctrine generally and 
of Section 2 in particular. In this Part, I focus on constitutional critiques 
of the role of racial bloc voting in the vote dilution inquiry, rather than 
on the contentions that Section 2 lacks a workable benchmark,160 
 
 157. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the 
Opt-in Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 745 (2006) [hereinafter Gerken, Third Way] (“When 
people cease to vote along racial lines, section 2 will become a paper tiger.”); Karlan, Two Section 
Twos, supra note 106, at 741 (characterizing the Gingles factors as a “durational limit on section 
2’s operation”). 
 158. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 533 (1997) (listing “termination dates” 
as an indicia of congruent and proportional legislation). The fact that the VRA’s coverage 
formula had a termination date did not prevent the Court from invalidating it on equal 
sovereignty grounds. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 538–39, 557 (2013). 
 159. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). 
 160. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 902–03 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“[I]n selecting the proportion that will be used to define the undiluted strength of a minority—
the ratio that will provide the principle for decision in a vote dilution case—a court must make a 
political choice.”). 
In holding that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable, the Court recently 
observed that the Constitution does not mandate proportional representation for political parties. 
See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2499 (2019). The Rucho Court’s animosity toward 
proportional representation has led some scholars to worry that a similar logic could be applied 
to Section 2 and De Grandy’s rough proportionality standard. See Travis Crum, Rucho and 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, TAKE CARE BLOG (June 27, 2019), https://takecareblog.com/
blog/rucho-and-section-2-of-the-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/ZW98-UKMX] (“Rucho 
channels concerns similar to those articulated in Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Holder 
v. Hall, where he criticized Section 2 for lacking a legitimate and manageable benchmark.”); 
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The Erasure of Racial Vote Dilution Doctrine, ELECTION L. BLOG 
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protects only Democratic-leaning districts,161 or does not encompass 
vote dilution claims as a matter of statutory interpretation.162  
The Court’s unease with racially polarized voting crops up in 
various doctrinal contexts across election law. The first and most 
prominent criticism is that Section 2 requires the consideration of race 
during the redistricting process. This critique reflects the Court’s more 
general shift toward a colorblind Constitution and is essentially a cross-
application of the theories underlying the Shaw cause of action. The 
second critique is that racially polarized voting is private action and 
therefore outside the purview of the Reconstruction Amendments. 
The final complaint is that Congress exceeded its Reconstruction 
Amendment enforcement authority when it adopted Section 2’s 
discriminatory effects standard. I address each criticism in turn. 
A. Race-Based Redistricting 
The most straightforward pronouncements of the Court’s 
preference for race-blind redistricting are found not in Section 2 cases, 
but rather in the Shaw line of cases. In contrast with vote dilution 
doctrine, Shaw’s “racial gerrymandering claim does not ask for a fair 
share of political power and influence, . . . [but] asks instead for the 
elimination of a racial classification.”163 Thus, Shaw claims are 
 
(June 28, 2019, 10:18 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=105855 [https://perma.cc/V5FP-SHS2] 
(criticizing the Court for failing to engage with racial vote dilution doctrine). 
 161. See Cox & Miles, supra note 89, at 2 (noting the criticism that the VRA’s “prohibition of 
minority vote dilution [is] a Democratic Party protection provision”); Kang, Democratic 
Contestation, supra note 27, at 744–45 (“The close association between African American voters 
and Democrats means that representational guarantees for African Americans under the VRA 
inevitably produce safe districts for Democrats that are almost completely insulated from partisan 
competition.”). This criticism of the VRA was perhaps more forceful when Section 5’s 
preclearance requirement was operative, since its retrogression principle generally prohibited a 
reduction in the number of majority-minority districts. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 466 
(2003). 
 162. Justice Thomas has long argued that Section 2’s text does not encompass vote dilution 
claims. See Holder, 512 U.S. at 922–23 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia 
also adhered to this view. See id. at 891. Justice Gorsuch recently concurred with Thomas’s 
approach. See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2335 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Although 
Thomas’s critique is difficult to square with Section 2’s plain language, the 1982 amendments’ 
legislative history, the VRA’s statutory history, and principles of stare decisis, this statutory 
argument is outside the scope of this Article. For a scholarly defense of Section 2’s application to 
vote dilution claims, see Lani Guinier, (E)racing Democracy: The Voting Rights Cases, 108 HARV. 
L. REV. 109, 118–25 (1994). 
 163. See Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2502. 
CRUM IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020  12:51 PM 
2020] RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING 289 
“analytically distinct”164 from—and in doctrinal tension with—vote 
dilution doctrine and Section 2’s requirement of race-based 
redistricting. 
In creating the racial gerrymandering cause of action, the Shaw 
Court explained that: 
[R]eapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. A 
reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who 
belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by 
geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in 
common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an 
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. It reinforces the 
perception that members of the same racial group . . . think alike, 
share the same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates 
at the polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as 
impermissible racial stereotypes.165 
The Shaw Court proclaimed that race-based redistricting 
“balkanize[s] us into competing racial factions”166 and speculated that 
“racial gerrymander[ing] may exacerbate the very patterns of racial 
bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to 
counteract.”167 The Shaw line of cases analogizes the purposeful 
creation of majority-minority districts to Jim Crow-style segregation.168  
Under Shaw, if “race was the predominant factor”169 in the 
creation of a particular district, then that “district must withstand strict 
scrutiny.”170 That is, the jurisdiction must “prove that its race-based 
sorting of voters serves a ‘compelling interest’ and is ‘narrowly tailored’ 
 
 164. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 652 (1993); see also Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, 
Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District 
Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 494 (1993) (“To begin to understand 
Shaw, one must first note that vote dilution is not involved in the case. The plaintiffs could not 
prove—and the Court acknowledged that they did not allege—vote dilution.”). 
 165. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647 (emphases added). 
 166. Id. at 657. 
 167. Id. at 648; see also ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, VOTING RIGHTS—AND WRONGS: THE 
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIALLY FAIR ELECTIONS 217 (2009) (“Majority-minority districts 
appear to reward political actors who consolidate the minority vote by making the sort of overt 
racial appeals that are the staple of invidious identity politics.”). 
 168. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (“Just as the State may not, absent 
extraordinary justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public parks, buses, golf 
courses, beaches, and schools, so did we recognize in Shaw that it may not separate its citizens 
into different voting districts on the basis of race.” (citations omitted)). 
 169. Id. at 916. 
 170. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017). 
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to that end.”171 The Court has “long assumed that complying with the 
VRA is a compelling interest”172 but has not given its full blessing that 
Section 2 would survive strict scrutiny. As for the narrow-tailoring 
prong, the Court has “give[n] States ‘breathing room’ to adopt 
reasonable compliance measures that may prove, in perfect hindsight, 
not to have been needed.”173 A state can satisfy the narrow-tailoring 
requirement if it “establish[es] that it had ‘good reasons’ to think that 
it would transgress the [VRA] if it did not draw race-based district 
lines.”174 In other words, if the state has a “strong basis in evidence” for 
believing that the VRA mandated the creation of a majority-minority 
district, it can avoid liability under Shaw.175 
Here, it should be emphasized that Shaw does not trigger strict 
scrutiny when mapmakers are merely aware of race.176 Rather, the 
“plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-
neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, 
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities 
defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.”177 And in 
jurisdictions with racial bloc voting, line drawers frequently claim that 
partisanship—not race—explains their redistricting choices,178 a 
defense that is likely to be raised even more often in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision holding that partisan gerrymandering 
claims are nonjusticiable political questions.179 
 
 171. Id. (quoting Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 800 (2017)). 
 172. Id. at 1469 (emphasis added); see also Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 801 (assuming that 
compliance with Section 5, when it was operative, was a compelling state interest); Shaw v. Hunt 
(Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996) (assuming that compliance with Section 2 is a compelling 
interest). 
 173. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464 (quoting Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 802). 
 174. Id. (quoting Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 278 (2015)). 
 175. Id. Defendants in Title VII cases can raise a similar “strong basis in evidence” defense to 
a disparate treatment claim. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 584–85 (2009). 
 176. See Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 797. 
 177. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995) (emphasis added). 
 178. See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1473; see also Hasen, Race or Party, supra note 50, at 1838–39 
(discussing this problem and using Cooper as an illustrative example). 
 179. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–08 (2019); Kristen Clarke & Jon 
Greenbaum, Gerrymandering Symposium: The Racial Implications of Yesterday’s Partisan 
Gerrymandering Decision, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2019, 2:01 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/
2019/06/gerrymandering-symposium-the-racial-implications-of-todays-partisan-gerrymandering-
decision [https://perma.cc/B84L-64Z4]. 
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Shaw casts a long shadow over Section 2.180 Indeed, the Shaw 
Court’s concerns about the use of race have surfaced even in situations 
where race did not predominate in the redistricting process. For 
example, Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Holder v. Hall is the 
most forceful criticism of incorporating racial bloc voting into the 
Section 2 analysis.181  
In Hall, Thomas noted that the “underlying premise” of “every 
minority vote dilution claim” is “that the group asserting dilution is not 
merely a racial or ethnic group, but a group having distinct political 
interests as well.”182 On this point, Thomas directly criticized Gingles’s 
requirement that voting be racially polarized.183 According to Thomas, 
the premises underlying Gingles “should be repugnant to any nation 
that strives for the ideal of a color-blind Constitution.”184 In so 
claiming, Thomas recycled many of Shaw’s criticisms and opined that 
Section 2’s “drive to segregate political districts by race can only serve 
to deepen racial divisions by destroying any need for voters or 
 
 180. In the 1990s, Shaw claims were brought by White plaintiffs to dismantle majority-
minority districts, but following the 2010 redistricting cycle, Black plaintiffs started bringing Shaw 
claims too. See Richard L. Hasen, Racial Gerrymandering’s Questionable Revival, 67 ALA. L. 
REV. 365, 365–66 (2015) (discussing Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 575 U.S. 254, 262–70 
(2015)). In this second wave of Shaw cases, Black plaintiffs challenged Southern States’ adoption 
of strict quotas for the percentage of minority voters in certain districts, purportedly to comply 
with Section 5 of the VRA. See Travis Crum, The Prospect of Bailing-in Texas: The Constitutional 
Argument for Bail-in, ELECTION L. BLOG (Sept. 16, 2018, 9:43 AM) (noting the differences 
between 1990s and 2010s Shaw claims), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=101141 [https://perma.cc/
Y9TK-MXFE]. 
Scholars and lawyers have debated the salience of this development. According to 
Professor Rick Hasen, Shaw’s “racial gerrymandering cause of action has been repurposed for 
new partisan warfare in cases in which the vote dilution claim under section 2 is not strong enough 
to stand on its own.” Hasen, Race or Party, supra note 50, at 1854. By contrast, prominent voting 
rights attorney Dale Ho argues that the 1990s Shaw cases “sought to turn the redistricting process 
away from race” whereas the 2010s Shaw cases sought “to root out intentional efforts to 
discriminate on the basis of race.” Ho, supra note 146, at 1891–92.  
Resolving this debate is a task left for a future article. In any event, because the Court 
refuses to acknowledge any distinction between these two waves of Shaw cases, the requirement 
that race-based redistricting triggers strict scrutiny means that Section 2 is still in peril. 
 181. Cf. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 139, at 870 (“Justice Thomas’s concurrence in 
Holder is in some ways the most extraordinary voting rights opinion of modern times.”). 
 182. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 903 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 183. See id. at 903–05. 
 184. Id. at 905–06. 
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candidates to build bridges between racial groups or to form voting 
coalitions.”185 
These colorblind concerns are not limited to Justice Thomas’s 
sometimes idiosyncratic jurisprudence. The Court has repeatedly 
interpreted the VRA to narrow its protections, often prompted by 
concerns about its use of race.186 Most relevant here, in Bartlett, a 
plurality of the Court cautioned against an expansive interpretation of 
Section 2, lest race become “unnecessarily infuse[d] . . . into virtually 
every redistricting [plan], raising serious constitutional questions.”187 
Chief Justice Roberts, moreover, famously described the Court’s vote 
dilution jurisprudence as “a sordid business, this divvying us up by 
race.”188 
Outside the voting rights realm, the Court has repeatedly 
questioned—and frequently prohibited—the explicit use of race in 
affirmative action programs.189 In a similar vein, the Court has voiced 
 
 185. Id. at 907; see also id. (“The ‘black representative’s’ function, in other words, is to 
represent the ‘black interest.’” (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 650 (1993))). 
 186. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 549–50, 557 (2013) (invalidating the VRA’s 
coverage formula); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009) 
(permitting political subdivisions to bail-out of the VRA’s coverage formula); Georgia v. 
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482–83 (2003) (allowing influence and coalition districts to count as 
majority-minority districts under Section 5’s retrogression analysis); Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd. 
(Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000) (holding that “§ 5 does not prohibit preclearance of 
a redistricting plan enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose”); Holder, 512 
U.S. at 885 (plurality opinion) (concluding that Section 2 could not be used to challenge the size 
of a governing body); Presley v. Etowah Cty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 503–08 (1992) (holding that 
rules altering the allocation of power within an elected body are not subject to the VRA’s 
preclearance requirement); see also Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, 
Administering Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 
2158 (2015) (“The Supreme Court has issued a string of decisions narrowing section 2 on the basis 
of the constitutional avoidance canon.”). These decisions were frequently the confluence of 
numerous concerns about the VRA’s constitutionality, in particular its federalism costs. See Guy-
Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race, Federalism, and Voting Rights, 2015 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 113, 114 (2015) (“Northwest Austin and Shelby County have thrust federalism into the 
heart of voting rights disputes.”); Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a 
Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1259 (2012) [hereinafter Tolson, 
Reinventing] (criticizing Northwest Austin for relying on a “free-floating federalism norm”). 
 187. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (plurality opinion) (quoting League of United 
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 446 (2006) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)). 
 188. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 511 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 189. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016) (upholding an 
affirmative-action plan but noting “the University’s ongoing obligation to engage in constant 
deliberation and continued reflection regarding its admissions policies”); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (invalidating the University of Michigan’s affirmative-action policy for 
undergraduate admissions). 
CRUM IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020  12:51 PM 
2020] RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING 293 
constitutional concerns about the predictable use of race to comply 
with the disparate-impact provisions of anti-discrimination laws.190 
These decisions all reveal the Court’s deep suspicion of the explicit—
or predictable—consideration of race.191 The Gingles precondition that 
plaintiffs must establish racial bloc voting to prevail on a statutory vote 
dilution claim is no exception. 
B. Private Action 
Before delving into the second criticism of the Gingles factors, a 
quick primer on state action is helpful. It is well established that the 
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits only state action.192 Given this 
limitation, Congress cannot exercise its Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority to target private conduct.193 By contrast, it is less 
settled whether the state action doctrine applies to the Fifteenth 
 
 190. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 543 
(2015) (“Courts should avoid interpreting disparate-impact liability to be so expansive as to inject 
racial considerations into every housing decision.”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (predicting that “the Court will have to confront the question: Whether, 
or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of [anti-discrimination statutes] consistent 
with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?” (citing Richard A. Primus, Equal 
Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493 (2003))). 
 191. See Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 21, at 1845. 
 192. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) (noting the “time-honored 
principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state action”). 
 193. See id. at 627 (invalidating civil remedies provision of the Violence Against Women Act); 
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 640 (1883) (invalidating Section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1871 for being “directed exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the 
laws of the State”). For a dissenting view on the state action doctrine, see Jack M. Balkin, The 
Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1819–21 (2010) [hereinafter Balkin, 
Reconstruction].  
Rather than rely on the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has invoked its Commerce 
Clause authority to regulate discrimination in the economic sphere. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 
379 U.S. 294, 305 (1965) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act under the Commerce Clause); 
Christopher W. Schmidt, Section 5’s Forgotten Years: Congressional Power to Enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 47, 73–83 (2018) 
(surveying the debate over whether Title II should be defended under the Fourteenth 
Amendment or the Commerce Clause). Congress, however, cannot rely on the Commerce Clause 
to protect the right to vote free of racial discrimination. 
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Amendment194 and, if it does, how broadly.195 This point will be 
unpacked more below,196 but suffice it to say that the critics of Gingles 
do not parse the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments on this score. 
With this background in mind, now for the critique. In a dissenting 
opinion, then-Justice Rehnquist asserted that racially polarized voting 
was “private rather than governmental discrimination.”197 Thus, 
according to Rehnquist, vote dilution “results from bloc voting” and is 
not “traceable to the discrimination of governmental bodies.”198 
Because private action falls outside the Reconstruction Amendments’ 
scope, Rehnquist’s argument goes, vote dilution is not a cognizable 
injury and thus Congress may not use its enforcement authority to 
remedy the effects of racial bloc voting.199 More recently, Justice 
Thomas similarly asserted that “racially polarized voting is not 
evidence of unconstitutional discrimination [and] is not state action” 
while arguing that Section 5’s preclearance provision and coverage 
formula were unconstitutional.200 Even though defenders of the VRA 
acknowledge that “racially polarized voting alone does not signal a 
constitutional violation,”201 Rehnquist and Thomas would simply 
ignore racially polarized voting and the schemes that can predictably 
dilute minority votes under those conditions. 
C. Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment Enforcement Authority 
The final critique of the Gingles factors is that Congress exceeded 
its enforcement authority when it expanded Section 2 to embrace a 
discriminatory effects standard.202 
 
 194. See Franita Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority over Elections, 99 B.U. L. 
REV. 317, 337 (2019) [hereinafter Tolson, Spectrum] (“[T]he Court initially enforced the Fifteenth 
Amendment against both private individuals and the states . . . [but] later imposed a state action 
requirement on the Fifteenth Amendment in 1903.”). 
 195. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953) (plurality opinion) (concluding that the 
Jaybird Association’s exclusion of Black voters from its Democratic Party straw poll qualified as 
state action and thus violated the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 196. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 197. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 216–17 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
Justice Stewart, the author of the Bolden plurality, joined Rehnquist’s dissent. See id. at 206. 
 198. Id. at 216. 
 199. See id. at 216–17. 
 200. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 228 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).  
 201. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 578 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
 202. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
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In many ways, the enforcement authority argument builds off the 
previous two critiques. If the Shaw Court is correct that the Equal 
Protection Clause imposes outer limits on race-based redistricting, 
then the Gingles factors are constitutionally suspect for injecting race 
into the redistricting process and forcing line drawers to determine 
whether racial bloc voting exists in their jurisdiction. Under the critics’ 
view, Gingles’s precondition that voting be racially polarized is an 
inappropriate means of remedying racial discrimination in voting. And 
if Rehnquist and Thomas are right on the state action issue, then 
Congress cannot combat the discriminatory effects of racial bloc 
voting, nor can it rely on high rates of racially polarized voting as part 
of a legislative record to justify Section 2.  
On the enforcement authority question, the distinction between 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments matters significantly. 
Recall that the Court has recognized vote dilution claims under the 
Fourteenth Amendment but has remained agnostic on whether the 
Fifteenth Amendment also encompasses such claims.203 As such, under 
current doctrine, Section 2 is arguably best conceptualized as an 
exercise of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority, since 
Congress would need to justify only its adoption of a discriminatory 
effects standard.204 In other words, under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Congress merely abrogated the intent requirement when it revised 
Section 2 in 1982. But under the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress may 
have needed to proscribe a whole new set of discriminatory voting 
practices—namely, dilutive schemes—in addition to eliminating the 
intent requirement.205  
Presuming that Section 2 should be defended under the 
Fourteenth Amendment—rather than the Fifteenth—is fraught with 
peril, however. For decades, the Court followed the deferential 
 
 203. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 204. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 n.1 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) 
(“The Voting Rights Act is generally viewed as an exercise of Fifteenth Amendment power. Since 
vote ‘dilution’ devices are in issue in this case, the rights at stake are more properly viewed as 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.” (citation omitted)); Elmendorf, Biased Votes, supra note 38, at 
401 n.117 (“Section 2 may need the Fourteenth Amendment as its anchor insofar as it reaches 
injuries beyond simple vote denial, as it remains disputed whether the Fifteenth Amendment goes 
any further.”). 
 205. Throughout this Article, I assume arguendo that the Fifteenth Amendment has an intent 
requirement. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62 (1980) (plurality opinion). That said, 
many of the arguments pertaining to the word “abridge” are applicable to whether the Fifteenth 
Amendment covers discriminatory effects. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
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rationality standard articulated in Katzenbach v. Morgan206 and South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach207 to review legislation passed pursuant to 
Congress’s Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement 
authority.208 In those decisions, the Court held that “[a]s against the 
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to 
effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in 
voting.”209 And under the Katzenbach standard, the Court also gave 
Congress leeway to independently interpret the Reconstruction 
Amendments.210 The Katzenbach standard is thus “a broad statement 
of congressional authority in relation to both the powers of the states 
and the Court.”211 
But in City of Boerne v. Flores,212 the Court significantly curbed 
Congress’s interpretive and remedial authority under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.213 At the first step of Boerne’s congruence and 
proportionality test, the Court “identif[ies] with some precision the 
scope of the constitutional right at issue.”214 The Court then examines 
the legislative record to ascertain “whether Congress identified a 
history and pattern of unconstitutional [conduct] by the States.”215 And 
at the final step, the Court determines whether “[t]here [is] a 
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or 
remedied and the means adopted to that end.”216 Because the Boerne 
Court arrogated to itself the sole responsibility of interpreting the 
Constitution and required a much tighter fit between the evil to be 
 
 206. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 207. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 208. See Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power To Enforce the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 
2365–74 (2003) [hereinafter Katz, Reinforcing Representation] (surveying several decisions 
applying Katzenbach’s rationality standard). 
 209. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (emphasis added). 
 210. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648; see also Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and 
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 184 (1997) 
[hereinafter McConnell, Institutions] (noting that, under Katzenbach, the question is “whether 
the congressional interpretation is within a reasonable range of plausible interpretations—not 
whether it is the same as the Supreme Court’s”). 
 211. Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1571 (footnotes omitted). 
 212. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 213. See id. at 519; Katz, Reinforcing Representation, supra note 208, at 2395. 
 214. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001). 
 215. Id. at 368. 
 216. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
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remedied and the means employed,217 several commentators have 
questioned whether a post-Boerne Court would uphold the VRA as an 
appropriate exercise of Congress’s Reconstruction Amendment 
enforcement authority.218  
It remains an open question whether Boerne applies to Congress’s 
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority,219 a point discussed 
more below.220 Because the above-referenced critiques are more 
forceful under Boerne than Katzenbach, the answer to that question 
may determine Section 2’s constitutionality.  
III.  RACIALLY POLARIZED VOTING DURING RECONSTRUCTION 
Racially polarized voting is not a modern phenomenon. In fact, 
the relevant starting point is the 1860s, not the 1960s. Contrary to what 
contemporary doctrine dictates,221 the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
enfranchise any Black citizens during Reconstruction.222 The 
Reconstruction Framers differentiated between civil and political 
rights and did not equate citizenship with suffrage.223 This latter point 
 
 217. See Katz, Reinforcing Representation, supra note 208, at 2362–68; Robert C. Post & Reva 
B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and 
Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 444–45 (2000). To be sure, under Boerne, the Court “appear[s] to give 
Congress even greater latitude to craft remedial legislation in areas of traditional equal protection 
strict scrutiny.” Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own 
Success?, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1715 (2004); see also Crum, Pocket Trigger, supra note 133, 
at 2022 (describing Boerne as having “a built-in sliding scale”). Thus, it is possible the Court may 
be more deferential in reviewing Section 2 because Congress has legislated on the topics of race 
and voting. 
 218. See, e.g., Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1736–37; Karlan, Two Section Twos, 
supra note 106, at 725–26. 
 219. See, e.g., Tolson, Spectrum, supra note 194, at 337. 
 220. See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing Boerne and Shelby County). 
 221. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985) (applying the Fourteenth 
Amendment to intentionally discriminatory vote denial laws); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 
541 (1927) (similar). 
 222. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1602 & n.362 (explaining that seventeen States 
prohibited Black suffrage even after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification). 
 223. The Reconstruction debates were “based on a tripartite division of rights, universally 
accepted at the time but forgotten today, between civil rights, political rights, and social rights.” 
Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1016 
(1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Desegregation]; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 382 (2005) [hereinafter AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION] 
(observing that the right to vote “lay outside the domain of mere citizenship”); Amar & 
Brownstein, supra note 25, at 929 (“[T]he drafters of the Reconstruction Amendments viewed 
political rights as qualitatively different from civil rights . . . .”). 
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is underscored by the disenfranchisement of women, who were treated 
as second-class citizens who could exercise civil rights but not political 
rights.224 Based on this rights framework, the Reconstruction Framers 
designed the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude protections for 
political rights225 because they feared that inclusion of Black suffrage 
in the Amendment would doom its ratification.226 “Even Republicans 
who favored black suffrage acknowledged that they lacked the votes to 
secure it” in the Fourteenth Amendment.227  
In this Part, I discuss the role of racially polarized voting during 
Reconstruction, both in the early days of Black suffrage in the South 
and in the lead-up to the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage and 
ratification. 
A. Racially Polarized Voting Before the Fifteenth Amendment 
Prior to the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage in 1869 and 
ratification in 1870,228 Black suffrage was already part of our nation’s 
political life—just not nationwide.229 Several Northern and Midwestern 
 
 224. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, at 382. 
 225. See, e.g., Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 928 (“The framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not intend its Equal Protection, Due Process, and Privileges and Immunities 
Clauses to interfere with state regulation of political rights.”); McConnell, Desegregation, supra 
note 223, at 1024 (“It was generally understood that the nondiscrimination requirement of the 
Fourteenth Amendment applied only to ‘civil rights.’ Political and social rights, it was agreed, 
were not civil rights and were not protected.”); David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution 
Mean What It Says?, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (2015) (“[A] straightforward reading of the text 
makes it clear that the Equal Protection Clause does not require equality in voting.”). But see 
Franita Tolson, What is Abridgment?: A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433, 458 
(2015) [hereinafter Tolson, Abridgment] (“Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was the 
Reconstruction Congress’s attempt to constitutionalize a mechanism that would allow Congress 
to all but legislate universal suffrage . . . .”). 
 226. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, at 392–93 (“Moderate 
Republicans feared they could not sell the equal-suffrage idea in the North, where white bigotry 
remained a stubborn fact of life.”); McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 223, at 1106 (“In 1866, 
the Radicals were unable to secure enough votes to guarantee black political rights in the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
 227. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND 
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 28 (2004); see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: 
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 260 (1988) (“The [Fourteenth] 
Amendment supplied Republicans with a platform for the [1866] campaign, while leaving to the 
future the issue of black suffrage.”). 
 228. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1563 (1869) (passage in the House); id. at 1641 
(passage in the Senate); 16 Stat. 1131–32 (1870) (ratification). 
 229. For an overview of the expansion of Black suffrage before the Fifteenth Amendment, 
see Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1593–97. 
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States had already extended the franchise to Black men.230 In 1867, 
Congress enacted a series of laws to enfranchise Black men in areas of 
federal control. Congress first enfranchised Black men in the District 
of Columbia231 and the federal territories.232 Congress also required 
Nebraska to enfranchise Black citizens as a “fundamental condition” 
of its admission to the Union.233 And, most importantly, Congress 
passed the First Reconstruction Act, which imposed Black suffrage on 
ten of the eleven ex–Confederate States and compelled them to hold 
new constitutional conventions chosen with an all-male electorate.234 
In a similar vein, Congress adopted two fundamental conditions for 
these Southern States’ readmission to the Union: that they never 
amend their state constitutions to disenfranchise Black citizens and 
that they ratify the Fourteenth Amendment.235 
The plight of the freedmen motivated Congress to enfranchise 
Black southern men for several reasons.236 First, the postwar southern 
governments quickly demonstrated that they could not be trusted to 
 
 230. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, 610 n.88 (noting that Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont all permitted Black suffrage by the 
end of the Civil War); GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 26–27 (stating that voters in Iowa and 
Minnesota endorsed Black suffrage in referenda in 1868 and that the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
issued a ruling enfranchising Black citizens in 1866). 
 231. See An Act To Regulate the Elective Franchise in the District of Columbia, ch. 6, 14 Stat. 
375 (1867). 
 232. See An Act To Regulate the Elective Franchise in the Territories of the United States, 
ch. 15, 14 Stat. 379 (1867). 
 233. See An Act for the Admission of the Territory of Nebraska into the Union, ch. 36, 14 
Stat. 391 (1867). During Reconstruction, the use of fundamental conditions for admission was 
controversial, even among Republicans. See EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869, at 127 (1990) (discussing Republican opposition to 
“the idea that Congress could set suffrage-related conditions for admission to statehood that 
would bind erstwhile territories after the admission process was completed”); Thomas B. Colby, 
In Defense of the Equal Sovereignty Principle, 65 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1163–64 (2016) (noting doubts 
about the validity of fundamental conditions). 
 234. See First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, § 5, 14 Stat. 428, 429 (1867) (requiring ten ex–
Confederate States to enfranchise male citizens over twenty-one years of age, regardless of “race, 
color, or previous condition”). The one Confederate State left out of the First Reconstruction Act 
was Tennessee, which enacted legislation enfranchising Black citizens in February 1867 after its 
readmission to the Union. See W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN 
AMERICA, 1860-1880, at 575 (2d ed. 1962). 
 235. See JOHN MABRY MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE 
FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 18 (1909).  
 236. Congress relied on the Guarantee Clause as its source of authority to enfranchise Black 
citizens in the Reconstructed South. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, at 374–75. 
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protect the freedmen.237 The Southern States enacted the notorious 
Black Codes, which attempted to reestablish a system of de facto 
slavery via strict vagrancy and labor-contract laws.238 In addition, the 
Southern States—with the exception of Tennessee—initially rejected 
the Fourteenth Amendment by huge margins.239 Congress attributed 
these decisions to the recalcitrance of the all-White southern 
electorate.240 Second, and relatedly, the postwar southern governments 
were dubiously loyal to the Union. Although the South generally sent 
Unionists to Congress, their hold on power was tenuous, as prominent 
Confederates came close to winning several elections and lesser-known 
rebels occupied lower posts.241 And third, the abolition of slavery 
meant that the Constitution’s infamous Three-Fifths Clause would no 
longer result in Black people being undercounted for apportionment 
purposes. The perverse upshot was that the Southern States would 
increase their share of seats in the House of Representatives—and 
concomitantly in the Electoral College—even though Black 
southerners remained disenfranchised.242 Despite losing the Civil War, 
White southerners’ political power would have been amplified at the 
federal level. 
Faced with these problems, the Reconstruction Framers turned to 
Black suffrage, predicting that Black voters would support the 
Republican Party and that empowering these voters would help 
transform the South.243 Upon reflection, the reasons for racial bloc 
 
 237. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Voting Rights Act of 1867: The Constitutionality of Federal 
Regulation of Suffrage During Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1590 (2004). 
 238. FONER, supra note 227, at 198–201. Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in 
direct response to the Black Codes. See id. at 244.  
 239. See 1 HANES WALTON, JR., SHERMAN C. PUCKETT & DONALD R. DESKINS, JR., THE 
AFRICAN AMERICAN ELECTORATE: A STATISTICAL HISTORY 235 tbl.13.2 (2012).  
 240. See id. at 235. 
 241. See FONER, supra note 227, at 196–97. Some prominent rebels were placed in positions 
of power. Georgia, for example, appointed former Confederate Vice President Alexander 
Hamilton Stephens to the U.S. Senate. Id. at 196. 
 242. See Chin, supra note 237, at 1589–90. Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment also 
addressed this problem by reducing a state’s seats in the House of Representatives if it “denied” 
or “abridged” the “right to vote” of its adult “male” “citizens.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; see 
also Pamela S. Karlan, Reapportionment, Nonapportionment, and Recovering Some Lost History 
of One Person, One Vote, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1921, 1931 (2018) (discussing the rationale 
behind Section Two). Section Two has never been enforced. Gerard N. Magliocca, Our 
Unconstitutional Reapportionment Process, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774, 783 (2018). 
 243. See MALTZ, supra note 233, at 132 (characterizing Black southerners as a “loyal 
counterweight to the potential political power of the rebellious whites”); Amar & Brownstein, 
supra note 25, at 939 (“Republicans anticipated that the black populations in the South would be 
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voting during Reconstruction are quickly apparent. Between 1860 and 
1868, the Republican Party abolished slavery,244 supported and won the 
Civil War,245 militarily occupied the South,246 passed the Freedmen’s 
Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,247 and adopted two 
constitutional amendments that protected the civil rights of Black 
people.248 The Republican Party also enfranchised Black men across 
the South249 and advocated Black suffrage at the state level in the 
North.250 
By contrast, the Democratic Party represented the old slave order 
and aligned itself with unabashed racists.251 Democrats vehemently 
opposed Black suffrage for racist and partisan reasons, predicting that 
Black voters would support Republicans.252 These White supremacist 
beliefs revealed themselves in other policy areas: no Democrat in 
either house of Congress voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1866 or the 
Fourteenth Amendment.253  
 
under siege and believed that political influence and voting power would be their sole means of 
defense.”); id. at 943 (“New black voters were expected to vote Republican . . . .”). 
 244. See FONER, supra note 227, at 2–3 (emphasizing the significance of the abolitionist 
movement and the Emancipation Proclamation); id. at 66–67 (discussing the ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment). 
 245. Black soldiers were an essential part of the Union’s war effort. See id. at 8 (“By the war’s 
end, some 180,000 blacks had served in the Union Army—over one fifth of the nation’s adult male 
black population under age forty-five.”); MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE FIGHT TO VOTE 61 (2016) 
(noting that Black soldiers accounted for ten percent of the Union army). Black soldiers’ military 
service was frequently invoked to justify the extension of suffrage. See Amar & Brownstein, supra 
note 25, at 932. 
 246. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing First Reconstruction Act). 
 247. See FONER, supra note 227, at 247–50. 
 248. See AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, at 398–400 (detailing Republican 
support for the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 249. See supra note 233–234 and accompanying text. 
 250. See GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 25–27. 
 251. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 227, at 293 (“[B]lacks identified the old [Democratic] 
political leaders with slavery.”); id. at 340–41 (discussing the Democratic Party’s racial appeals in 
the 1868 campaign); Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 946 (“Democrats’ opposition to black 
suffrage would certainly have cemented the allegiance of the new voters to the party of Lincoln.”). 
To provide just one example of the racism espoused by Democratic politicians, a Democratic 
senator stated during the debate over the Fifteenth Amendment that, “[w]hile the white man for 
two thousand years past has been going upward and onward, the negro race wherever found 
dependent upon himself has been going downward or standing still.” CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 
3d Sess. 989 (1869) (statement of Sen. Hendricks). 
 252. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 947–48. 
 253. J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING 
OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 39 tbl.1.2 (1999). Even beyond issues of race and civil rights, 
there was less ideological overlap between political parties in the nineteenth century than in the 
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In light of these divergent worldviews, the Reconstruction 
Framers’ political predictions proved prescient.254 But to fully 
appreciate the impact of the First Reconstruction Act, it is useful to 
consider the country’s racial demographics during Reconstruction. 
Given slavery’s labor-intensive nature and the fact that many Northern 
States prohibited Black migration prior to the Civil War,255 Black 
people were heavily concentrated in the South. Three Southern 
States—Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina—were majority 
Black. In addition, Black people were above 45 percent of the 
population in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia, and around 40 percent 
in North Carolina and Virginia. Black people were about a quarter of 
the population in Arkansas and Texas.256 Between 1866 and 1867, the 
percentage of the nation’s Black men that could vote went from 0.5 
percent to 80.5 percent,257 a massive increase largely attributable to the 
First Reconstruction Act.258  
Black voters thus constituted effective voting majorities in five 
Southern States—Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South 
 
twentieth century. See Kang, Hyperpartisan Gerrymandering, supra note 24, at 1393–94 
(describing the mid- to late-nineteenth century as an era of extreme partisanship in Congress). 
 254. These predictions were not uniformly shared. At the dawn of Reconstruction, some 
southerners—including avowed racist President Andrew Johnson—believed that the freedmen 
would “vote with their former owners.” FONER, supra note 227, at 186. 
 255. See LAURA F. EDWARDS, A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 83 (2015) (noting that Black people were denied entry to several Midwestern 
States). 
 256. See FONER, supra note 227, at 294; see also AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra 
note 223, at 374 (providing similar figures but estimating that Black people were just shy of a 
majority in Louisiana). 
 257. RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE TWO RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK 
ENFRANCHISEMENT 24 (2004).  
 258. During Reconstruction, Black people represented 12.7 percent of the population. 
See GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 82 tbl.1 (providing statistics for 1870). That figure is 
comparable to today’s 13.4 percent. Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ 
quickfacts/fact/table/US/RHI225218 [https://perma.cc/358E-DUJZ]. However, compared to 
Reconstruction, Black people are now less concentrated in the South. See SONYA RASTOGI, 
TALLESE D. JOHNSON, ELIZABETH M. HOEFFEL & MALCOM P. DREWERY, JR., U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, at 7 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/
cen2010/briefs/c2010br-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB82-RDPX] (finding that 55 percent of Black 
people live in the South); id. at 9 (finding that California, Illinois, Ohio, and New York have 
substantial Black populations). And unlike during Reconstruction, there are currently no 
majority-Black States. See id. at 8 tbl.5. Four States, however, are majority-minority. See 2010 
Census Shows America’s Diversity, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar. 24, 2011), 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb11-cn125.html [https://perma.cc/ 
D8Z5-NJ6K] (listing California, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas).  
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Carolina—given their high registration rates and the 
disenfranchisement of ex-Confederates pursuant to the First 
Reconstruction Act.259 And these were not slim majorities. In 1867, 
Black men were over 60 percent of registered voters in Alabama, 
Louisiana, and South Carolina.260 Looking at the South as a whole, 
Black registered voters outpaced White registered voters by a wide 
margin.261 
These newly empowered Black voters quickly reshaped southern 
and national politics in the multiracial elections that occurred prior to 
the Fifteenth Amendment—namely, the 1867–68 elections associated 
with the southern constitutional conventions, which were mandated by 
the First Reconstruction Act, as well as the 1868 general election. Black 
voters demonstrated their strong support for the Republican Party and 
its agenda. 
In the southern state-level elections, Black voters decisively 
backed the new constitutional conventions. Across the South, Black 
voters accounted for between 66 percent and 97 percent of the votes in 
favor of the constitutional conventions.262 And in a remarkable degree 
of unanimity, not a single Black voter cast a ballot against the 
constitutional conventions in Alabama, Florida, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina.263 Black turnout was also high, ranging from 70 percent 
to nearly 90 percent.264 Furthermore, for the first time in our nation’s 
history, Black politicians were elected to office,265 though not in 
proportion to their percentage of the population.266 Republicans 
 
 259. See FONER, supra note 227, at 294 n.27; VALELLY, supra note 257, at 32–33 tbl.2.1; see 
also WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 244 tbl.13.7 (showing that over 47,000 ex-Confederates 
were disenfranchised in Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia). 
 260. See WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 239 tbl.13.3. 
 261. The scholarly estimates vary somewhat. See VALELLY, supra note 257, at 32 (reporting 
a 703,000 to 627,000 Black–White registration gap); WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 246 
tbl.13.9 (highlighting a 772,850 to 727,424 Black–White registration gap); Xi Wang, Black Suffrage 
and the Redefinition of American Freedom, 1860-1870, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2213 (1996) 
[hereinafter Wang, Black Suffrage] (pointing to a 735,000 to 635,000 Black–White registration 
gap). Black voters also outnumbered White voters in several southern cities. See HOWARD N. 
RABINOWITZ, RACE RELATIONS IN THE URBAN SOUTH, 1865-1890, at 264 (1978). 
 262. See WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 241 fig.13.2. 
 263. See id. at 241. 
 264. See FONER, supra note 227, at 314. 
 265. Id. at 316. 
 266. See id. at 318 (showing that Black officials were underrepresented in most States). But 
see DU BOIS, supra note 234, at 372 (showing that Black delegates accounted for 61 percent, 50 
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controlled the new southern governments formed by these 
conventions267 and quickly ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, 
helping it get over Article V’s three-fourths hurdle.268  
At the federal level, the 1868 election results vividly demonstrated 
the importance of Black voters to Republican electoral success. 
President Grant’s slim popular-vote victory—300,000 out of 5.7 million 
votes—was attributed to the support of 500,000 Black voters, mostly in 
the South.269 Moreover, due to Black voters’ support, Grant won every 
readmitted ex–Confederate State except Georgia and Louisiana, 
where Klan violence suppressed the Black vote.270 The southern Black 
voting bloc also elected 250 Black state legislators in 1868.271  
Conversely, White southerners generally opposed the 
constitutional conventions and voted for Democrats.272 But to be clear, 
White southerners were not uniformly Democrats. Those White 
southerners who remained loyal to the Union—alternatively called 
Unionists or scalawags, depending on the speaker’s viewpoint—tended 
to vote Republican.273 And White northerners who moved to the South 
during Reconstruction—known as carpetbaggers—supported the 
Republican Party.274 White Republicans in the South, however, lacked 
the numbers to exercise real political power and needed the help of 
Black voters to win elections.275 The alliance between Black and White 
Republicans was sometimes fraught. Many Unionists, for example, 
 
percent, and 40 percent of delegates at the South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida conventions, 
respectively). 
 267. See RICHARD H. ABBOTT, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE SOUTH, 1855-1877, at 
108, 164 (1986). 
 268. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 25, at 197–98, 211. 
 269. See id. at 236; Wang, Black Suffrage, supra note 261, at 2214–15. 
 270. See RON CHERNOW, GRANT 623 (2017).  
 271. See KOUSSER, supra note 253, at 19 fig.1.1. Throughout Reconstruction, several Black 
officials served on the city councils in Atlanta, Montgomery, Nashville, and Raleigh. 
RABINOWITZ, supra note 261, at 265.  
 272. See FONER, supra note 227, at 297 (“In no Southern state did Republicans attract a 
majority of the white vote.”); WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 240 tbl.13.4 (showing White 
voters’ support for the constitutional conventions ranging from 8.5 percent to 33.6 percent). 
 273. See FONER, supra note 227, at 294 (discussing scalawags); id. at 300 (“The most extensive 
concentration of white Republicans . . . lay in the upcountry bastions of wartime Unionism.”). 
 274. See id. at 294–95. 
 275. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 942 (“Loyal white Unionists in the South, 
acting alone, lacked the ability to protect themselves. They certainly did not have the power to 
transform the region. Republicans believed that, together, newly freed black men and loyal whites 
could wrest governmental authority from rebel leadership.”). 
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were “reluctan[t] . . . to vote for black candidates,” meaning that most 
Black officials were elected from overwhelmingly Black districts 
located in former plantation areas.276 Overall, Black voters almost 
uniformly supported the Republican Party whereas White southerners 
leaned Democratic.277 
The reality of racially polarized voting was known during 
Reconstruction—and known by Congress.278 Of course, there were 
obvious reasons for partisan divides along racial lines and the election 
results spoke for themselves. But critically, the House and the Senate 
each commissioned reports on voter turnout and registration rates in 
the southern constitutional convention elections.279 The Senate Report 
even catalogued these statistics by race and identified the number of 
White and Black men voting for and against the constitutional 
conventions.280 This data collection was possible because voting was 
not yet by secret ballot281 and the Union Army—tasked with keeping 
an uneasy peace in the South—adopted a policy of using different lines 
and registrars for Black and White voters in many southern 
jurisdictions.282  
B. Racially Polarized Voting and the Fifteenth Amendment 
These election results were not lost on the Reconstruction 
Framers, who candidly recognized the role of racial bloc voting in 
debating the Fifteenth Amendment. As in any group decision-making 
process,283 the Reconstruction Framers had numerous reasons for 
advocating nationwide Black suffrage when the lame-duck Fortieth 
 
 276. FONER, supra note 227, at 355; see also id. at 331 (noting that Black voters’ “very 
unanimity as Republicans meant their ballots could be taken for granted by party leaders seeking 
the white vote”); SARAH WOOLFOLK WIGGINS, THE SCALAWAG IN ALABAMA POLITICS, 1865–
1881, at 71 (1977) (attributing Unionist defections in Alabama in 1870 to the presence of a Black 
candidate running statewide). 
 277. To be sure, there were some Black Democrats. See FONER, supra note 227, at 291 (“The 
few black Democrats (mostly individuals dependent for a livelihood on white patronage) were 
considered ‘enemies to our people.’”). 
 278. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, at 397–98. 
 279. See WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 237–40.  
 280. See id. at 237.  
 281. See Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 224 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“Voting was public until 1888 when the States began to adopt the Australian secret ballot.”). 
 282. See WALTON ET AL., supra note 239, at 240.  
 283. Cf. Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 981–
82 (2017) (noting the “common refrain” that “Congress is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it’”). 
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Congress convened in early 1869. The goal here is not to demonstrate 
which motive was primary but rather to show that racial bloc voting 
was a widely shared and openly acknowledged assumption motivating 
the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage. 
On the ideological front, many Radical Republicans started their 
careers as abolitionists and viewed Black suffrage as the next logical 
step in that struggle.284 Most relevant here, these Radicals believed that 
the right to vote would empower Black citizens to mobilize politically 
and defend their own interests. As Senator Edmund Ross (R-KS) 
eloquently stated, “[t]he ballot is as much the bulwark of liberty to the 
black man as it is to the white.”285 Or as Frederick Douglass would later 
put it: “What does this fifteenth amendment mean to us? I will tell you. 
It means that the colored people are now and will be held to be, by the 
whole nation, responsible for their own existence and their well or ill 
being.”286 
Undergirding this theory was the explicit belief that Black and 
White southerners had starkly divergent interests. Senator Henry 
Corbett (R-OR), for example, stated that Black voters were “pretty 
much the only people in those States who were loyal” and that the 
ballot would allow them to “protect themselves in the southern 
reconstructed States.”287 This view was widely shared in the Republican 
caucus in light of the Black Codes passed in the early days of 
Reconstruction and the virulent racism of the Democratic Party.288 The 
racial bloc voting in the 1868 election further reinforced this point.289 
 
 284. See FONER, supra note 227, at 448. 
 285. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 983 (1869) (statement of Sen. Ross); see also id. (“No 
class, no race is truly free until it is clothed with political power sufficient to make it the peer of 
its kindred class or race and enable it to resist the contingencies of popular commotion.”). 
 286. XI WANG, THE TRIAL OF DEMOCRACY: BLACK SUFFRAGE & NORTHERN 
REPUBLICANS, 1860-1910, at 51 (1997) (quoting a speech by Frederick Douglass).  
 287. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1008 (1869) (statement of Sen. Corbett). 
 288. See id. at 983 (statement of Sen. Ross) (“The only sure protection of this nation against 
the ultimate reestablishment of that [peculiar] institution, is by the adoption and rigid 
maintenance in all the States of the doctrine of impartial suffrage.”); id. at 693 (statement of Rep. 
Shanks) (“No man is safe in his person or property in a community where he has no voice in the 
protection of either.”); MALTZ, supra note 233, at 132 (observing that Republicans viewed Black 
southerners as a “loyal counterweight to the potential political power of the rebellious whites”); 
Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 939 (arguing that the Reconstruction Framers believed 
that “black people needed the right to vote in order to be able to protect themselves against the 
enactment of pernicious laws by white southerners”). 
 289. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 983 (1869) (statement of Sen. Ross) (“The 
history of the last presidential canvass ought to be a warning to prompt and decisive action.”). 
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Thus, the Republicans’ ideological argument hinged on an 
empowerment philosophy: the ballot would give Black people the 
means to participate in the political arena and thereby protect their 
own interests.290 Or, to foreshadow the Supreme Court’s often-cited 
formulation, Republicans believed that the right to vote is 
“preservative of all rights.”291 
On the partisan front, the Reconstruction Framers recognized that 
nationwide Black suffrage would unlock a large Republican-leaning 
voting bloc.292 By 1869, Black men could vote in only seventeen of the 
thirty-four states.293 Even though the vast majority of Black men in the 
nation had already been enfranchised by the First Reconstruction 
Act,294 it was estimated at the time that 150,000 Black men would be 
enfranchised by the Fifteenth Amendment.295 Many of these potential 
Black voters lived in the four Border States—Delaware, Kentucky, 
Maryland, and Missouri—which had sizable Black populations due to 
their recent history as Slave States.296 And in other closely divided 
Northern States—namely, Connecticut, New Jersey, Ohio, and 
Pennsylvania—the influx of reliably Republican Black voters was 
expected to tip certain elections.297  
Responding to concerns that nationwide Black suffrage would 
alienate White people and cost Republicans votes, Representative 
George Boutwell (R-MA), who introduced the Fifteenth Amendment 
in the House,298 declared: 
There are one hundred and fifty thousand citizens of the United 
States who by this bill will be entitled to the elective franchise but who 
are now disfranchised—seventeen hundred in Connecticut, ten 
 
 290. Cf. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–28 
(1985) (arguing that discrete and insular minorities have advantages within the political system). 
 291. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 
17 (1964) (“Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”).  
 292. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 943–46 (highlighting the Reconstruction 
Framers’ vehement belief that Black voters would support the Republican party). 
 293. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1602 & n.362.  
 294. See VALELLY, supra note 257, at 24. 
 295. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 561 (1869) (statement of Rep. Boutwell) 
(reporting the estimated number of newly-enfranchised Black voters in different states). 
 296. Black people represented the following percentages of the population in these States: 
Delaware (18.2 percent); Kentucky (16.8 percent); Maryland (22.5 percent); and Missouri (6.9 
percent). GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 82 tbl.1. 
 297. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 945 n.84. 
 298. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 285 (1869). 
CRUM IN PRINTER FINAL(DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2020  12:51 PM 
308  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:261 
thousand in New York, five thousand in New Jersey, fourteen 
thousand in Pennsylvania, seven thousand in Ohio, twenty-four 
thousand in Missouri, forty-five thousand in Kentucky, four thousand 
in Delaware, thirty-five thousand in Maryland—who will rally to the 
support of this constitutional amendment if by the law they are 
enfranchised.299 
Senator Charles Sumner (R-MA), one of the most prominent and 
persistent Radicals in Congress,300 echoed this sentiment in promoting 
Black suffrage: 
You need votes in Connecticut, do you not? There are three thousand 
fellow-citizens in that State ready at the call of Congress to take their 
place at the ballot-box. You need them also in Pennsylvania, do you 
not? There are at least fifteen thousand in that great State waiting for 
your summons. Where you most need them, there they are; and be 
assured they will all vote for those who stand by them in the assertion 
of Equal Rights.301 
Suffice it to say, it was widely assumed during Reconstruction that 
newly enfranchised Black voters would support the Republican 
Party.302 Thus, not only was racially polarized voting known during 
Reconstruction, but the Reconstruction Framers deliberately 
capitalized on it. As Boutwell and Sumner made abundantly clear, the 
Republican Party knew it was expanding its voter base when it enacted 
the Fifteenth Amendment. This does not denigrate the Republicans’ 
intentions. Rather, it explains their motivation. Like their ideological 
goals, the Radicals’ self-interested argument hinged on an 
 
 299. Id. at 561 (statement of Rep. Boutwell). Boutwell made this statement during a debate 
over whether nationwide Black suffrage should be achieved via federal statute or constitutional 
amendment. For more on this debate, see Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1604–16. 
 300. See McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 223, at 987.  
 301. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 904 (1869) (statement of Sen. Sumner); see also 
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner) (raising a similar 
point). It is unclear why Boutwell and Sumner had different estimates of the Black populations 
of Connecticut and Pennsylvania. 
 302. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 724 (1869) (statement of Rep. Ward) 
(estimating that 250,000 Black people were disenfranchised in the Border States and that 600,000 
Black people were disenfranchised in the North); AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 
223, at 397 (“[T]his infusion of new voters might give Republicans extra electoral security in the 
coming years.”); GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 113 (“In New Jersey 4,200 potential Negro voters 
might well overturn an 1868 Democratic presidential majority of 2,800.”). Republicans also 
recognized that some White voters may become alienated by nationwide Black suffrage but 
expected that such defections would be outweighed by new Black voters. See AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, at 398. 
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empowerment philosophy: the right to vote would allow Black voters 
to mobilize and support the Republican Party, which, in turn, would 
protect their interests.  
Racially polarized voting, moreover, was critical to the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s ratification. All ten states that Congress put under 
military Reconstruction ratified the Fifteenth Amendment,303 though 
Congress compelled ratification by four of those states as a 
fundamental condition for their readmission to the Union.304 The 
Southern States were thus instrumental in pushing the Fifteenth 
Amendment over Article V’s three-fourths requirement for 
ratification—a threshold that would not have been reached but for the 
southern Black electorate.305 
Republicans also recognized that the Fifteenth Amendment was 
necessary for Congress to protect Black southerners in the future, 
further evidencing the party’s belief that racially polarized voting 
would persist. Recall that the Reconstruction Congress conditioned 
the readmittance of ten Southern States on their inclusion of Black 
suffrage in their state constitutions.306 But as the Southern States re-
joined the Union, there was considerable uncertainty as to whether 
Congress possessed constitutional authority to protect Black voters. As 
an initial matter, Democrats asserted—and some Republicans 
agreed—that fundamental conditions violated the equality of the 
states.307 Even setting aside that problem, the consensus view was that 
the Fourteenth Amendment did not protect political rights.308 As such, 
Congress was left without options for revising voter qualifications of 
the readmitted Southern States.309 The Fifteenth Amendment 
 
 303. See First Reconstruction Act, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867); GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 
84–85 tbl.2. 
 304. Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia were all required to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment as 
part of their readmission to the Union. See GILLETTE, supra note 33, at 100–01. Georgia was 
required to ratify the Fifteenth Amendment for its second readmission to the Union. See id. at 
84–85 tbl.2 & 101–03. 
 305. See id. at 84–85 tbl.2; Chin, supra note 237, at 1587–88. 
 306. See supra notes 233–35 and accompanying text. 
 307. See Colby, supra note 233, at 1162–64; cf. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 
(2013) (striking down the VRA’s coverage formula as violative of the equal sovereignty 
principle). 
 308. See supra notes 222–27 and accompanying text. 
 309. Congress could have stripped backsliding states of their seats in the House under Section 
Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that provision has never been enforced. See supra note 
242. 
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therefore significantly expanded “congressional authority to regulate 
voting rights in the states” and sought to ensure that Black men would 
not be disenfranchised after the Southern States re-joined the Union.310 
Tragically, the Fifteenth Amendment would prove insufficient to 
protect the rights of Black voters. It is well-known that violence, fraud, 
and outright disenfranchisement helped establish Jim Crow, but 
dilutive schemes and gerrymandering also played a significant role in 
its creation.311 Toward the end of Reconstruction, “Mississippi 
Redeemers concentrated the bulk of the black population in a 
‘shoestring’ Congressional district running the length of the Mississippi 
River, leaving five others with white majorities.”312 Other Southern 
States followed suit and drew gerrymandered congressional districts to 
reduce Black political power.313 Similar dilutive schemes were also 
enacted at the state and local level.314 Like all dilutive tactics, these 
Redemption-era gerrymanders relied on racially polarized voting to 
diminish minority voting power. Thus, racially polarized voting was not 
only a central motivating factor in the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage 
but was also exploited to dilute minority political power at the end of 
Reconstruction. 
This evidence clearly demonstrates that Black citizens voted as a 
near-uniform bloc for Republicans, that White southerners leaned 
heavily in favor of the Democratic Party, and that these political 
realities were acknowledged and well-known during Reconstruction. 
The Fifteenth Amendment attempted to address the root cause of the 
 
 310. Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1621 (emphasis omitted). 
 311. See FONER, supra note 227, at 590. 
 312. Id. 
 313. See JOSEPH H. CARTWRIGHT, THE TRIUMPH OF JIM CROW: TENNESSEE RACE 
RELATIONS IN THE 1880S, at 223 (1976) (discussing gerrymander of Tennessee congressional 
district); KOUSSER, supra note 253, at 26–31 (discussing gerrymanders of congressional districts 
in North Carolina, Mississippi, and South Carolina). For a series of helpful color-coded maps 
showing how gerrymandering at the end of Reconstruction shifted political power to the 
Democrats, see KENNETH C. MARTIS, THE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1789-1989, at 123–31 (1989). 
 314. See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 313, at 158 (describing the 1889 redistricting of 
Chattanooga that packed Black voters into two of eight districts); FONER, supra note 227, at 422, 
590 (discussing municipal gerrymandering in Alabama, North Carolina, and Virginia); KOUSSER, 
supra note 253, at 31 (discussing gerrymandering at the state level); RABINOWITZ, supra note 261, 
at 270 (“Gerrymandering in its various forms was the most effective tactic used by sympathetic 
legislatures both to redeem the cities and to keep them in the hands of white Democrats.”); 
LAWRENCE D. RICE, THE NEGRO IN TEXAS, 1874-1900, at 25 (1971) (discussing the 
gerrymandering of Texas’s judicial districts). 
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problem: widespread private discrimination that was transformed into 
state power by an all-White and largely racist electorate. Rather than 
representing an “impermissible racial stereotype[],”315 this political 
reality motivated the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage. Unlike today, 
racially polarized voting was not a constitutional taboo during 
Reconstruction. 
IV.  RECONSTRUCTING RACIAL VOTE DILUTION 
In defending Gingles and Section 2, scholars recognize that voting 
rights are distinct from civil rights and that vote dilution claims are 
premised on group-based conceptions of the right to vote. Professors 
Pam Karlan and Daryl Levinson, for example, emphasize that “[r]acial 
identification in the electoral context . . . is essentially ‘bottom-up,’ 
produced by the choices of members of the black community to unite 
politically.”316 And Professor Heather Gerken argues that vote dilution 
is best conceptualized as an “aggregate harm” rather than purely a 
violation of a voter’s individual rights.317 Although these scholars 
correctly point out that voting rights deserve a distinctive framework, 
their claims are premised on political theory or an interpretation of the 
VRA, rather than a historical and contextual understanding of the 
Reconstruction Amendments. This Article fills this gap in the 
literature.318 
 
 315. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). 
 316. Karlan & Levinson, supra note 27, at 1218. 
 317. Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1681. According to Gerken, aggregate rights 
differ from individual rights in three ways: (1) “fairness is measured in group terms”; (2) an 
individual’s right “rises and falls with the . . . group”; and (3) “the right is unindividuated among 
members of the group.” Id. 
 318. The closest academic account to my claim is an article published over two decades ago 
by Professors Vikram Amar and Alan Brownstein, which examines the debates over the Fifteenth 
Amendment and contends that the Shaw Court erred in its treatment of race-based redistricting. 
See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 919. Amar and Brownstein’s argument differs from 
mine in several important respects. First and foremost, Amar and Brownstein do not engage with 
vote dilution doctrine; in fact, they do not even cite Gingles. See id. at 976–77 (spending two pages 
discussing vote dilution doctrine and acknowledging that they give it “only brief consideration”). 
Nor do they attempt to defend Gingles in particular or vote dilution doctrine more generally 
under the Fifteenth Amendment. Furthermore, Amar and Brownstein advance a less doctrinal 
and more theoretical claim about political rights, directing their attention to debates over 
women’s suffrage and the jury-exclusion cases. See id. at 956–72 (women’s suffrage); id. at 981–
1005 (jury exclusion). And given the vast changes in election law that have transpired since 1998, 
Amar and Brownstein do not engage with recent and significant decisions, including the Boerne 
Court’s curtailment of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority. 
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Acknowledging the role of racially polarized voting during 
Reconstruction has significant implications for modern vote dilution 
doctrine. Indeed, this historical insight demonstrates that the Court’s 
colorblind critiques319 misapprehend Congress’s Reconstruction 
Amendment authority to remedy and deter dilutive schemes that 
exploit racially polarized voting. And given several Justices’ professed 
adherence to originalism, the Reconstruction Framers’ views and 
candid discussions of racial bloc voting are particularly relevant. This 
is especially salient because the same Justices who purport to be 
originalist are the biggest supporters of Shaw and the most fervent 
critics of Gingles. In many ways, these Justices’ application of 
colorblind principles—originally developed under the Equal 
Protection Clause—to Fifteenth Amendment cases appears to reflect 
modern normative preferences more than fidelity to the original 
understanding of the Reconstruction Amendments. 
In this Part, I advance two ways to reconceptualize racial vote 
dilution claims and the Gingles factors. The first argument builds off 
the Court’s holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
intentional racial vote dilution and then rebuts the colorblind concerns 
that have been articulated in the Shaw line of cases and smuggled into 
Section 2 jurisprudence. Put simply, the Court’s unease with 
recognizing racial bloc voting is totally detached from how the issue 
was viewed during Reconstruction. 
My second claim is that reimagining vote dilution claims as 
violations of the Fifteenth Amendment is doctrinally defensible, 
historically justified, normatively preferable, and strategically savvy. 
This doctrinal reshuffling is not pointless formalism. As Professors 
Guy-Uriel Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer suggest, when “voting 
rights lawyers and scholars begin to think of a response to Shelby 
County, they will need to provide a compelling account of what 
constitutes racial discrimination in voting in the 21st century,” 
including whether it covers “only state action” or also encompasses 
“[r]acially polarized voting by the electorate.”320 This Article answers 
that call by taking the Fifteenth Amendment seriously as an 
independent constitutional provision and thinking through how vote 
dilution doctrine would work under that Amendment. 
 
 319. See supra Part II. 
 320. Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Voting Rights Act in Winter: The 
Death of a Superstatute, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1389, 1423–24 (2015). 
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Recall that the Reconstruction Framers differentiated between 
political and civil rights.321 Based on that hierarchy of rights, the 
Reconstruction Framers understood that the Fourteenth Amendment 
primarily protected civil rights and did not mandate the 
enfranchisement of any Black voters during Reconstruction.322 Hence, 
the need for the Fifteenth Amendment.323 Modern doctrine, however, 
papers over the Reconstruction-era understanding of rights.324  
Reorienting voting rights doctrine toward the Fifteenth 
Amendment would correct this problem and avoid transplanting the 
colorblind concerns emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Fifteenth Amendment, where they are an ill fit. This intervention 
is also important because state action under the Fifteenth Amendment 
has been traditionally understood to cast a wider net than the 
Fourteenth Amendment,325 thus creating more doctrinal breathing 
room for considering contemporary levels of racial bloc voting and 
combatting the dilutive schemes that exploit it. Finally, because it is an 
open question whether Boerne’s congruence and proportionality test 
applies outside the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2 may be more 
defensible under the Fifteenth Amendment. 
To be clear, my argument in this Article is not that the 
Reconstruction Framers specifically intended to prohibit vote dilution 
under the Fifteenth Amendment or that the original expected 
application of that Amendment was to prohibit vote dilution.326 Rather, 
my claim is that that the original public meaning of the Fifteenth 
Amendment does not foreclose an examination of racially polarized 
voting as part of a vote dilution claim and that, at a minimum, vote 
dilution claims are within Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority. 
 
 321. See supra notes 221–27 and accompanying text. 
 322. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 928. 
 323. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1621. 
 324. See McConnell, Desegregation, supra note 223, at 1025 (“T[he Reconstruction Framers’] 
categorization of rights plays no part in current interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The distinction between civil and political rights has been utterly obliterated.”). 
 325. See supra Part II.B. 
 326. See infra note 374 and accompanying text. In other words, I am not making an argument 
based on original intent or original expected application. Cf. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 
1114 (2003) (surveying the different schools of originalism). 
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A. Reconstructing Shaw and Gingles 
The Reconstruction Framers recognized that a South without 
Black suffrage was a South with the Black Codes. In the early days of 
Reconstruction, White southerners’ racist preferences were enacted 
into law through a discriminatory electoral system,327 albeit one that 
barred Black citizens from the polls rather than diluted their votes. In 
seeking to transform the South, the Reconstruction Framers 
enfranchised Black men in the First Reconstruction Act, assuming that 
they would vote en masse to support the Republican Party and protect 
their political interests.  
By the time the Reconstruction Framers were debating and 
passing the Fifteenth Amendment, they had witnessed landslide 
multiracial elections across the South. The Reconstruction Framers’ 
predictions proved accurate and Black voters overwhelmingly 
supported Republicans. The upshots were the ratification of the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the first-ever Black elected 
officials, Republican control of the southern constitutional 
conventions, and the election of President Grant. 
And most importantly for present purposes, the Reconstruction 
Framers did not shy away from recognizing the existence of racial bloc 
voting. Numerous Republicans—including Representative Boutwell, 
who introduced the Fifteenth Amendment in the House—were explicit 
about their belief that Black voters would mobilize as a bloc.328 The 
Reconstruction Framers’ “arguments in favor of extending the 
franchise” were thus “grounded on the perceived need for and 
anticipated benefits of blacks voting as a coherent force.”329 
If the Court were to view racially polarized voting through the lens 
of Reconstruction, the doctrinal tension between Shaw and Gingles 
would evaporate. Here, given that Shaw’s concerns bleed into the 
criticisms of the Gingles factors, they can be treated as two sides of the 
same coin. 
Under the colorblind worldview, Section 2’s mandate for creating 
majority-minority districts threatens to “unnecessarily infuse race into 
virtually every redistricting [plan], raising serious constitutional 
 
 327. See supra Part III.A. 
 328. See supra Part III.B. 
 329. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 929 (emphasis added). 
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questions.”330 The Court’s suspicion of the mere acknowledgement of 
racial bloc voting under Gingles is misguided. For starters, Shaw 
triggers strict scrutiny only if the use of race predominates during the 
redistricting process.331 The critics of Gingles, however, do not limit 
their complaints about race-based redistricting to those situations.332 
This hair-trigger approach to race would have seemed totally alien 
during Reconstruction. The Reconstruction Framers frankly discussed 
the humanitarian—and partisan—importance of Black suffrage.333 
Racial bloc voting was instrumental in the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
passage and ratification. It would be beyond ironic if those same 
concerns could no longer be acknowledged under that Amendment.334 
Underlying the doctrine, the Court seems particularly troubled by 
the presumption that “members of the same racial group . . . think 
alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same 
candidates at the polls.”335 But “[t]he voluntariness of racial and ethnic 
 
 330. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 21 (2009) (plurality opinion). 
 331. See supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text. Outside the political realm, the Court 
has left the door open to situations where race is clearly considered in the decision-making process 
but explicit racial classifications are not employed. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519, 545 (2015) (“When setting their larger goals, local 
housing authorities may choose to foster diversity and combat racial isolation with race-neutral 
tools, and mere awareness of race in attempting to solve the problems facing inner cities does not 
doom that endeavor at the outset.”); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) 
(“School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and 
races through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools” and “drawing 
attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of the neighborhoods . . . .”). 
 332. See supra notes 180–88 and accompanying text.  
 333. See supra Part III.B. 
 334. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 25, at 919 (“One cannot invalidate government race 
consciousness in the political rights realm on grounds that it reflects unconstitutional assumptions 
without dealing with the fact that the very constitutional provisions establishing political rights 
for minorities were premised on those same assumptions.”). 
 335. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). As a doctrinal matter, Gingles does no such 
thing. Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing the Gingles factors and must prove that voting is, 
in fact, racially polarized. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51 (1986). And indeed, 
plaintiffs have demonstrated racial bloc voting in numerous lawsuits. See Katz et al., Documenting 
Discrimination, supra note 33, at 756–70 tbl.B (collecting cases). But even this burden of proof is 
insufficient for Gingles’s critics, who claim that, “as practically applied,” the preconditions are 
“little different from a working assumption that racial groups can be conceived largely as political 
interest groups.” Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 905 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment). Of course, defendants sometimes concede certain Gingles factors in Section 2 
litigation. See Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 16 (plurality opinion). But in Shaw cases, line drawers must 
have a “strong basis in evidence” for treating voting as racially polarized. Cooper v. Harris, 137 
S. Ct. 1455, 1464 (2017); see also supra notes 173–75 and accompanying text. This requirement 
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group affiliation in the political process requires that [racial] groups be 
recognized as expressing legitimate interests; not to do so would be to 
denigrate the autonomy of those individuals who choose to affiliate 
themselves along this axis.”336 The Reconstruction Framers recognized 
this fact.337 The current Court does not. Rather than follow the 
Reconstruction generation’s view of racial bloc voting, the Court is 
putting forth its own normative vision of how politics should be 
organized, how electoral coalitions should be formed, and how citizens 
should vote. 
The Court’s teleological account of racial politics is also divorced 
from the Constitution.338 According to the Court, race-based 
redistricting “threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political 
system in which race no longer matters—a goal that the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments embody.”339 Contrary to the Court’s rose-
colored view, the Reconstruction Framers assumed that racial bloc 
voting would persist into the future. Indeed, the Reconstruction 
Framers pushed through the Fifteenth Amendment because they did 
not trust White southerners to protect the rights of the freedmen—a 
concern that was heightened after the Southern States were readmitted 
to the Union and Congress lacked authority to regulate their suffrage 
qualifications.340 And once again, the Reconstruction Framers’ 
prediction proved tragically correct. The end to Reconstruction 
revealed the dark side of racial bloc voting, as the Redeemers 
gerrymandered Black voters out of political power.341 
Moreover, the Court’s self-aggrandized role in leading our nation 
to a post-racial future is difficult to square with the historical context 
of Reconstruction. The Reconstruction Amendments were designed to 
 
bolsters Section 2’s constitutionality by preventing jurisdictions from merely assuming racial bloc 
voting.  
 336. Karlan & Levinson, supra note 27, at 1217 (emphasis omitted). 
 337. See supra Part III.B. 
 338. See Gerken, Third Way, supra note 157, at 744–45 (observing that the Court’s cases 
reflect “a search for the right strategy to bring us closer to the world of normal politics”).  
 339. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657. 
 340. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
33 (1980) (discussing the Reconstruction Framers’ distrust of southern legislatures); KLARMAN, 
supra note 227, at 29 (explaining that, after the Southern States were readmitted to the Union, 
“Congress did not clearly possess alternative, constitutionally permissible means of mandating 
black suffrage by statute”). 
 341. See supra notes 311–14 and accompanying text. 
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empower Congress—not the Court—to enforce their provisions.342 
And in 1982, Congress, following much deliberation and after 
considering evidence of racially polarized voting,343 revised Section 2 
of the VRA to prohibit vote dilution and to encompass a 
discriminatory effects standard.344 Congress has determined that 
racially polarized voting and vote dilution remain serious problems. 
The Court’s overt skepticism of that choice is inappropriate under the 
Reconstruction Amendments. 
Given the Court’s institutional role, its diagnosis of racial politics 
is—unsurprisingly—dubious. In seeking to test Shaw’s underlying 
premises, a recent study by Professors Stephen Ansolabehere and Nate 
Persily concluded that “residents of [majority-minority districts] are 
indistinguishable from residents of other districts in their answers to 
questions attempting to measure belief in racial stereotypes.”345 The 
study further concluded that “[t]o the extent [that there are] 
statistically significant differences across districts, those differences are 
not among racial minorities, but among Whites, and can be explained 
by the relative conservatism of Southern Whites.”346 In other words, 
race-based redistricting has not “balkanize[d] us into competing racial 
factions.”347 Or consider the Shelby County Court’s claim that “[t]hings 
have changed in the South,”348 which was quickly rebutted by a wave 
of voter-suppression laws enacted after the VRA’s coverage formula 
was invalidated.349 
 
 342. See AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, supra note 223, at 361–63 (describing the 
Reconstruction Framers’ decision to adopt McCulloch’s deferential standard for Congress’s 
Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority); Balkin, Reconstruction, supra note 193, at 
1805 (“Congress gave itself these powers because it believed it could not trust the Supreme Court 
to protect the rights of the freedmen.”); McConnell, Institutions, supra note 210, at 182 (“Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment was born of the fear that the judiciary would frustrate 
Reconstruction by a narrow interpretation of congressional power.”). 
 343. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982) (listing the Senate Factors). 
 344. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
 345. Stephen Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Testing Shaw v. Reno: Do Majority-Minority 
Districts Cause Expressive Harms?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2015). 
 346. Id. By contrast, the VRA’s “coverage formula actually did a remarkably good job of 
picking out states whose non-black residents harbor exceptionally negative stereotypes of African 
Americans.” Elmendorf & Spencer, Racial Stereotyping, supra note 52, at 1127. 
 347. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). 
 348. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 540 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting Nw. 
Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009)). 
 349. See, e.g., Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc) 
(invalidating Arizona’s restrictions on out-of-precinct ballots and third-party ballot collectors), 
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To be clear, “a political system in which race no longer matters”350 
is a laudable goal. It is also a quintessentially modern goal, one at odds 
with how the Reconstruction Framers viewed the issue. Thus, if the 
Court thinks that it is the best-positioned institution in our democracy 
to decouple race and politics, then it needs a different, non-originalist 
theory for questioning the VRA’s protections and for second-guessing 
Congress’s solution to the problem of racial discrimination in voting. 
Or to put it more bluntly, to the extent Gingles’s critics think that vote 
dilution doctrine raises “questions of political philosophy, not 
questions of law,”351 they are guilty of the same sin—imposing their 
own political preferences instead of following their purported 
adherence to originalism.352 
Focusing now on Gingles and the VRA, recall that Congress relied 
on its Reconstruction Amendment enforcement authority to adopt 
Section 2’s discriminatory effects standard.353 Thus, the “distinction 
between the constitutional [vote dilution] claim, which requires proof 
of intent, and the statutory claim, which demands only proof of 
discriminatory results, will be quite important when the 
constitutionality of § 2 is challenged.”354 The greater the overlap 
 
cert. granted sub nom. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 19-1257, 2020 WL 5847130 (U.S. 
Oct. 2, 2020); N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 242 (4th Cir. 2016) 
(striking down North Carolina’s post-Shelby County voter-suppression law); Patino v. City of 
Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667, 673–74 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (finding that city’s post-Shelby County 
redistricting plan intentionally diluted the votes of Hispanic voters).  
 350. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657. 
 351. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 901 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 352. Justice Thomas is the Court’s most prominent and uncompromising originalist. He 
recently questioned the Court’s one-person, one-vote precedent on the grounds that “[t]he 
Constitution does not prescribe any one basis for apportionment within States.” Evenwel v. 
Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1133 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Despite his 
willingness to reconsider some aspects of the Fourteenth Amendment’s application to voting 
rights, Thomas continues to follow Shaw, a doctrine based solely on the Equal Protection Clause. 
See Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1485–86 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring) (defending Shaw); 
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 649 (holding that the Shaw cause of action is premised on the Equal Protection 
Clause). And in arguing that Section 5 and the VRA’s coverage formula were unconstitutional, 
Thomas invoked Boerne notwithstanding its dubious originalist pedigree. See Nw. Austin, 557 
U.S. at 225–26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (relying on 
Boerne); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (renouncing Boerne); 
McConnell, Institutions, supra note 210, at 194 (criticizing Boerne on originalist grounds). The 
selectivity of Thomas’s application of originalism to election law cases appears—pardon the 
pun—gerrymandered. 
 353. See supra Part I.C. 
 354. Gerken, Undiluted Vote, supra note 5, at 1674. 
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between the constitutional and statutory standard, the more likely it is 
that Section 2 will survive that inevitable constitutional challenge.  
Although Gingles puts greater emphasis on racial bloc voting in 
the statutory vote dilution analysis,355 it has always been part of the 
constitutional inquiry.356 The Gingles factors, therefore, are a 
refinement of the constitutional standard, not an abandonment of it. 
Both the constitutional and statutory tests look to whether minority 
voters have an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. 
The Gingles factors brought much-needed order and predictability to 
vote dilution litigation by prioritizing compactness and racial bloc 
voting in the inquiry.357 
Finally, under my view, supporters of Section 2 could point to high 
levels of racially polarized voting—nationwide and especially in the 
South358—to defend against the inevitable constitutional challenge.359 
Put simply, jurisdictions with “racial polarization in voting have a 
greater need for prophylactic measures to prevent purposeful race 
discrimination.”360 And here, it is important to distinguish between the 
Court’s misconception of the Reconstruction Amendments and the 
function of the Gingles preconditions. Notwithstanding that the 
Reconstruction Framers assumed racial polarization would continue 
into the future, the Gingles factors do, in fact, place a de facto sunset 
 
 355. Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 21, at 1851. 
 356. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982) (“The minority’s voting power in a 
multimember district is particularly diluted when bloc voting occurs and ballots are cast along 
strict majority-minority lines.”); supra Part I.C (discussing White’s totality-of-the-circumstances 
standard). 
 357. See supra note 144–146 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra Part I.B. 
 359. The Shelby County Court refused to credit evidence of higher rates of racially polarized 
voting in the South. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 578 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (discussing congressional findings about racial bloc voting). Under my theory, 
Congress could also point to disparate levels of racially polarized voting in crafting a new coverage 
formula. See Elmendorf & Spencer, Racial Stereotyping, supra note 52, at 1128 (arguing in favor 
of a new coverage formula that “treat[s] racial discrimination by voters as the linchpin for 
coverage”). However, given Shelby County’s equal sovereignty principle and its hostility to 
proxies for unconstitutional conduct, see Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 550–51, a coverage formula 
based solely on racially polarized voting may raise constitutional concerns. See Travis Crum, The 
Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2019, TAKE CARE BLOG (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-voting-rights-advancement-act-of-2019 [https://perma.cc/9ENA-FH7L] 
(explaining that coverage formulas based on proxies are more open to constitutional challenge). 
 360. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 578 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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date on Section 2.361 If our nation ever does achieve a post-racial 
politics, then Section 2 will no longer have a role to play in vote dilution 
litigation. 
Instead of refusing to even acknowledge the realities of racially 
polarized voting, the Court should recognize that Section 2 plays an 
invaluable role in ensuring that minority voters’ political power is not 
diminished by the use of redistricting plans and dilutive schemes that 
predictably exploit racial bloc voting.  
B. Reconstructing the Fifteenth Amendment 
The Court has repeatedly declined to decide whether the Fifteenth 
Amendment encompasses vote dilution claims.362 But if such claims are 
cognizable under the Fifteenth Amendment’s substantive scope or 
within Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment enforcement authority, then 
there are good reasons not to transplant the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
colorblind principles to vote dilution doctrine. This reorientation of 
voting rights doctrine to the Fifteenth Amendment responds to each of 
the concerns articulated above concerning Gingles in particular and 
vote dilution doctrine more generally.363 
1. Race-Based Redistricting.  At the risk of repetition, the Court 
has voiced concern that Section 2 will entrench racial divisions and 
compel the overt consideration of race in redistricting.364 These 
concerns mirror the Court’s hostility to race-conscious laws and 
represent yet another instantiation of “[t]he idea that equal protection 
might affirmatively prohibit the use of statutory disparate impact 
standards.”365 This criticism of Section 2 stems from the Court’s 
conflation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as well as its 
 
 361. See Gerken, Third Way, supra note 157, at 745; Karlan, Two Section Twos, supra note 
106, at 741. 
 362. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 159 (1993). 
 363. See supra Part II. There are two ways litigants could establish that the Fifteenth 
Amendment encompasses vote dilution claims. They could wait and defend Section 2 against a 
future constitutional challenge under a Fifteenth Amendment theory. Alternatively, they could 
go on the offense and bring constitutional claims as part of an attempt to “bail-in” a jurisdiction 
under the VRA. See Crum, Pocket Trigger, supra note 133, at 2035 (arguing that Section 3(c) 
could be used to “relitigate the outer limits of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments”). This 
latter strategy has the potential upshot of creating precedent that could later be invoked to defend 
Section 2. 
 364. See supra Part II.A. 
 365. Primus, supra note 190, at 495. 
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refusal to acknowledge the differences between political and civil 
rights.366 In other words, the Court has improperly transplanted 
colorblind principles from its equal protection jurisprudence to the 
voting rights realm. But the well-worn debate between proponents of 
the anticlassification and antisubordination principles is an odd fit for 
the Fifteenth Amendment.367  
For the Reconstruction Framers, the relevant touchstone was 
equal access to suffrage and the empowerment of Black voters,368 not 
the colorblind notion that race and politics should not intersect. The 
Reconstruction Framers were well aware that Black and White voters 
in the former Confederacy had dramatically divergent interests and 
that these differences would be reflected in their preferred political 
parties. As such, the Reconstruction Framers recognized that political 
rights were exercised by groups, not just individuals.  
And rather than treat racial bloc voting as a taboo, the 
Reconstruction Framers repeatedly referenced it as a reason to pass 
the Fifteenth Amendment. To be sure, that reason mingled altruistic 
concerns with partisan self-interest. But everyone—including 
opponents—recognized what was at stake in passing the Fifteenth 
Amendment: the empowerment of a new Black voter base in the 
Border States and additional federal protections for already 
enfranchised Black voters in the South.369  
Moreover, the political power wielded by Black voters during 
Reconstruction was substantial. After the passage of the First 
Reconstruction Act, Black voters were effective majorities in five 
states.370 Racial bloc voting thus allowed Black voters to push through 
 
 366. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 21, at 1845; Crum, Superfluous, supra 
note 25, at 1564–65. 
 367. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of 
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1280–81 (2011) (outlining this debate). To 
simplify somewhat, the colorblind, or anticlassification, school of thought believes that explicit 
racial classifications are unconstitutional “except as a remedy for specific wrongdoing,” id., and 
has begun to question the constitutionality of “race-conscious, facially neutral initiatives,” id. at 
1282. By contrast, the antisubordination school of thought “would allow (or require) government 
to remedy practices that entrench historic inequalities among racial groups.” Id. Professor Reva 
Siegel goes beyond this classic dichotomy and identifies a third school of thought—the 
antibalkanization school—which “understands that race-conscious, facially neutral interventions 
may promote social cohesion by promoting equal opportunity.” Id. at 1283. 
 368. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 983 (1869) (statement of Sen. Ross) (“The 
ballot is as much the bulwark of liberty to the black man as it is to the white.”).  
 369. See supra Part III. 
 370. See FONER, supra note 227, at 294 n.27; VALELLY, supra note 257, at 32–33 tbl.2.1. 
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the new southern constitutions and ensured that Republicans 
controlled all of those conventions. Although relegated to minority 
status in the country as a whole, Black voters could control 
governments in the South, where they were demographically 
concentrated at the time.371 Given our nation’s federal structure, Black 
suffrage “create[d] a distinct type of political space . . . where 
[nationwide] electoral minorities [could] enjoy the dignity to decide” 
their own fate.372 By mobilizing as a group, Black voters were able to 
protect their own interests.373 
This theoretical account raises the question: Does the Fifteenth 
Amendment protect against vote dilution? Turning to the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s text, two key phrases signal the Amendment’s broad 
potential application.374 First, the Fifteenth Amendment protects the 
“right . . . to vote.”375 That term, however, is not self-defining.376 On a 
narrow view, the right to vote means the basic mechanics of registering, 
casting a ballot, and having it counted.377 But on a broader view, the 
right to vote could mean the right to cast a meaningful ballot. In other 
words, the right to vote encompasses the right to not have one’s vote 
 
 371. See supra notes 256–61 and accompanying text (discussing demographics of 
Reconstruction). That said, Black voters were rarely represented in proportion to their 
percentage in the population, see supra notes 265–66, and “their very unanimity as Republicans 
meant their ballots could be taken for granted by party leaders seeking the white vote,” FONER, 
supra note 227, at 331. 
 372. Gerken, Second-Order, supra note 116, at 1104; see also Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: 
Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 48–59 (2010) (arguing that federalism allows 
racial minorities to control certain institutions). 
 373. As is well-known, Reconstruction ended in tragedy. In addition to the exploitation of 
racial bloc voting by Redemption-era gerrymanders, Black voting power was nullified by an 
unrelenting campaign of terror, fraud, and outright disenfranchisement. See FONER, supra note 
227, at 590; see also supra notes 311–14 and accompanying text. Moreover, as recent partisan 
gerrymandering cases have demonstrated, it is possible to dilute the votes of a majority party. See 
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1925 (2018) (observing that Wisconsin “Democrats [would] 
need[] 54% of the statewide vote to secure a majority in the legislature”). 
 374. In keeping with this Article’s attempt to engage Gingles’s critics, I advance mainly 
originalist and textualist arguments. In the discussion that follows, I am not purporting to fully 
address the metes and bounds of the Fifteenth Amendment. See infra notes 375–96 and 
accompanying text. That is a task for a future article.  
 375. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 376. Cf. Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights To Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. 
L. REV. 1705, 1719 (1993) (conceptualizing the right to vote as a participatory right, an aggregative 
right, and a right of governance). 
 377. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion) (construing the 
Fifteenth Amendment as limited to whether racial minorities can “register and vote without 
hindrance”). 
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diluted—an opportunity to elect one’s candidate of choice.378 The 
Fifteenth Amendment, moreover, does not specify that the “right to 
vote” is tied to any particular election, and the Court has construed 
that phrase to apply broadly.379  
Second, the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits the “deni[al] or 
abridg[ment]” of the right to vote.380 The fact that the Reconstruction 
Framers selected two verbs is telling. An interpretation of the Fifteenth 
Amendment limited to mere vote denial claims would “render[] some 
words altogether redundant.”381 Indeed, as Justice Marshall explained 
in his Bolden dissent, “[b]y providing that the right to vote cannot be 
discriminatorily ‘denied or abridged,’” the Fifteenth Amendment 
“assuredly strikes down the diminution as well as the outright denial of 
the exercise of the franchise.”382 
But this is more than just disjunctive phrasing. The Reconstruction 
Framers’ use of the word “abridged” militates in favor of broadly 
protecting the right to vote. At the time, dictionaries defined “abridge” 
as “to contract,” “to diminish,” or “[t]o deprive of.”383 Today, the word 
“abridge” similarly means “to reduce in scope” or to “diminish.”384 
And since the term “denied” adequately captures the scenario where a 
voter is prevented from casting their ballot, the term “abridge” 
presumably carries this broader meaning. 
 
 378. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2018); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973). 
 379. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 523 (2000) (“The [Fifteenth] Amendment applies to 
‘any election in which public issues are decided or public officials selected.’” (quoting Terry v. 
Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 468 (1953) (plurality opinion))); see also Davis v. Guam, 932 F.3d 822, 830 
(9th Cir. 2019) (“The text of the Fifteenth Amendment states broadly that the right ‘to vote’ shall 
not be denied. It does not qualify the meaning of ‘vote’ in any way.” (citation omitted)). 
 380. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 381. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 574 (1995); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended 
to be without effect.”); ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 174–79 (2012) (discussing the surplusage canon). 
 382. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 126 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 383. JOHNSON’S ENGLISH DICTIONARY 58 (J.R. Worcester ed., Phila., Jas. B. Smith & Co. 
1859); see also JOSEPH E. WORCESTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 6 (Bos., 
Swan, Brewer & Tileston 1860) (“To curtail; to reduce; to contract; to diminish.”); WILLIAM G. 
WEBSTER & WILLIAM A. WHEELER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2 (N.Y. & 
Chi., Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor & Co. 1878) (“To deprive; to cut off.”). Here, I avoid citing the 
definitions that clearly reference the abridged version of a published work and focus instead on 
the more generic definitions. 
 384. Abridge, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
abridge [https://perma.cc/3XK4-YHKR]. 
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Moreover, “[w]hen seeking to discern the meaning of a word in 
the Constitution, there is no better dictionary than the rest of the 
Constitution itself.”385 Prior to the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage, the 
word “abridge”—or its variations—appeared three times in the 
Constitution.386  
Most famously, the First Amendment provides that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”387 Of course, 
there is substantial case law interpreting the First Amendment to 
broadly protect free speech.388 Just as the First Amendment has been 
expansively construed to protect free expression, so too should the 
Fifteenth Amendment be read to protect the right to vote free of racial 
discrimination. 
In addition, the Fourteenth Amendment uses the word “abridge” 
not once, but twice. Section One provides that “[n]o State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States.”389 Unlike the First Amendment, there is 
scant doctrine on the meaning of the word “abridge” in the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Privileges or Immunities Clause is essentially a 
 
 385. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2681 (2015) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 
748 (1999) (defining intratextualism as “read[ing] a contested word or phrase that appears in the 
Constitution in light of another passage in the Constitution featuring the same (or a very similar) 
word or phrase”). 
 386. Since the Fifteenth Amendment, the word “abridged” has been used in every subsequent 
voting rights amendment that has prohibited discriminatory voter qualifications. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIX (concerning women’s suffrage); U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (concerning poll tax); 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (concerning age). 
As this Article was in the penultimate stage of publication, a divided panel of the Fifth 
Circuit held that “an election law abridges a person’s right to vote for the purposes of the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment only if it makes voting more difficult for that person than it was before the law 
was enacted or enforced.” Tex. Democratic Party v. Abbott, No. 20-50407, 2020 WL 5422917, at 
*15 (5th Cir. Sept. 10, 2020). For critiques of this badly reasoned decision, see Travis Crum, 
Abridging the Right to Vote in the Fifth Circuit, TAKE CARE BLOG (Sept. 15, 2020), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/abridging-the-right-to-vote-in-the-fifth-circuit [https://perma.cc/LY55- 
2YP5], and Joshua A. Douglas, Opinion, A Texas Federal Court Decision is the Latest Hit to Voting 
Rights in America, CNN (Sept. 12, 2020, 7:56 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/12/opinions/
voting-rights-texas-26th-amendment-election-douglas/index.html [https://perma.cc/T5YS- 
T73M]. 
 387. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 388. See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment 
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its 
subject matter, or its content.”). 
 389. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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doctrinal dead letter, though not because of the word “abridge.”390 
Section Two authorizes a reduction of a state’s seats in the House of 
Representatives if “the right to vote” of any adult male citizens is 
“denied . . . or in any way abridged.”391 Section Two’s apportionment 
penalty has never been enforced by Congress,392 but the connection 
between the “deni[al] . . . or . . . abridg[ment]”393 of the right to vote 
and a reduction in House seats underscores the Reconstruction 
Framers’ understanding that political rights were exercised 
collectively. Given the temporal closeness between the Fourteenth and 
 
 390. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 758–59 (2010) (plurality opinion) 
(declining to revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 
78–79 (1872) (narrowly construing the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting rights 
associated with federal citizenship). 
 391. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. Scholars have recently turned their attention to Section 
Two and debated its ongoing relevance. See AMAR, UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION, supra note 24, 
at 188 (arguing that Section Two “provides the missing foundations for the general ‘right to vote’ 
championed by the Warren [Court] majority”); Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon 
Disenfranchisement, and the Right To Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 260 (2004) (arguing that Section Two was “repealed 
upon ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment”); Michael Hurta, Note, Counting the Right To 
Vote in the Next Census: Reviving Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 TEX. L. REV. 
147, 170–73 (2015) (arguing that the Census Bureau or a court should enforce Section Two); 
Magliocca, supra note 242, at 776 (arguing that the current statutory scheme for apportioning 
representatives violates Section Two); Earl M. Maltz, The Forgotten Provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: Section 2 and the Evolution of American Democracy, 76 LA. L. REV. 149, 178 (2015) 
(“[C]haracterizing Section 2 as fully embracing the modern ideal of one person, one vote would 
be a mistake.”); Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the Right to Vote Under Section 
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 310 (2015) (“A requirement that 
applied to persons of all races did not ‘abridge’ anyone’s right to vote on account of race.”); 
Tolson, Abridgment, supra note 225, at 458 (“Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was the 
Reconstruction Congress’s attempt to constitutionalize a mechanism that would allow Congress 
to all but legislate universal suffrage . . . .”). 
In July 2020, the Trump Administration sought to exclude undocumented immigrants from 
the congressional apportionment process on the grounds that those undocumented immigrants 
are not “inhabitants” for purposes of Section Two. See Hansi Lo Wang, With No Final Say, Trump 
Wants To Change Who Counts For Dividing Up Congress’ Seats, NPR (July 21, 2020, 6:34 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/07/21/892340508/with-no-final-say-trump-wants-to-change-who- 
counts-for-dividing-up-congress-seat [https://perma.cc/85GK-3XLN] (discussing a Trump 
Administration memorandum calling for “the exclusion of unauthorized immigrants from the 
numbers used to divide up seats in Congress among the states”); see also New York v. Trump, 20-
CV-5770, 2020 WL 5422959, at *32 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2020) (holding that the Trump 
Administration memorandum violates two statutory provisions governing reapportionment). 
Alabama has also filed a lawsuit seeking to exclude undocumented immigrants from the 
reapportionment process. See Alabama v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 396 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1046 (N.D. 
Ala. 2019). At the time of writing, these disputes have not been fully resolved. 
 392. See Magliocca, supra note 242, at 783.  
 393. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
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Fifteenth Amendments and that “abridged” in Section Two is tied to 
voting rights, a similar inference should be applied to the Fifteenth 
Amendment.394  
Here, I do not purport to exhaustively address whether the 
Fifteenth Amendment prohibits vote dilution.395 Rather, my claim is 
that the Fifteenth Amendment permits mapmakers, courts, and 
Congress to consider racially polarized voting and that, even if the 
Fifteenth Amendment does not itself proscribe vote dilution, Congress 
may take that additional step under its enforcement authority.396 
2. Private Action.  Reframing vote dilution as a Fifteenth 
Amendment injury provides a powerful response to the criticism that 
racial bloc voting is private action. Although the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s text refers to the states and the federal government, the 
Court has interpreted the Amendment to prohibit certain private 
actions that interfere with the right to vote free of racial discrimination. 
Shortly after the Fifteenth Amendment’s ratification, Congress passed 
laws prohibiting private electoral violence,397 and the Supreme Court 
upheld those laws.398 It was not until 1903 that the Court imposed a 
 
 394. See Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. 
L. REV. 379, 414 (2014) (“[T]he textual and historical link between section 1 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment and section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . mandate that they be interpreted 
in light of each other in determining the scope of congressional authority.”). 
 395. See supra note 374. 
 396. See infra Part IV.B.3.  
 397. An Act To Enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States To Vote in the Several 
States of this Union, ch. 114, § 5, 16 Stat. 140, 141 (1870); cf. McConnell, Desegregation, supra 
note 223, at 984 (“The actions taken by Congress from 1868 through 1875 to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the congressional deliberations over those measures thus present 
the best available evidence of the original understanding of the meaning of the 
Amendment . . . .”). The statute that was proposed simultaneously with the Fifteenth 
Amendment also covered private action. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1605 n.379 
(discussing H.R. 1667, 40th Cong. (1869)).  
 398. See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665–66 (1884) (holding that Congress could 
prohibit private interference with the right to vote free of racial discrimination under the Fifteenth 
Amendment). In United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875), the Court invalidated two provisions 
of the Enforcement Act of 1870. Section 3 imposed criminal penalties on election officials who 
“wrongfully refuse[d] or omit[ted] to receive [or] count . . . the vote of such citizen.” Id. at 217. 
Section 4 imposed criminal penalties on “any person who shall, by force, bribery, threats, 
intimidation, or other unlawful means, hinder [or] delay . . . any citizen from doing any act 
required to be done to qualify him to vote, or from voting, in any election.” Id. (emphasis added). 
Section 3 thus targeted state actors whereas Section 4 proscribed public and private conduct. The 
Court invalidated both provisions because Congress had not specified that the denial of the right 
to vote needed to be based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude—not because Section 
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state action requirement on the Fifteenth Amendment.399 Nonetheless, 
the Court subsequently adopted an expansive interpretation of state 
action under the Fifteenth Amendment, including primaries held by 
private clubs.400 Read together, these cases “provide[] precedent for 
congressional proscription of private conduct under the [F]ifteenth 
[A]mendment.”401  
The Court, therefore, conceives of state action more broadly 
under the Fifteenth Amendment than under the Fourteenth.402 This 
creates much-needed doctrinal space for considering high levels of 
racially polarized voting as part of the Gingles inquiry and for 
defending Section 2 more generally. And the fact that the 
Reconstruction Framers repeatedly referenced racial bloc voting in 
passing the Fifteenth Amendment means that it should remain proper 
to take that phenomenon into account today. 
To be sure, even if racial bloc voting is deemed private action, that 
is a separate question from whether Congress and the judiciary can 
consider its existence when determining the legality of a particular 
electoral scheme. A redistricting plan itself is state action; it is, after all, 
a law passed by a state or locality.403 Rehnquist and Thomas therefore 
err in focusing on racial bloc voting because the relevant action for vote 
dilution purposes is the dilutive scheme itself. 
 
4 criminalized private action. See id. at 218 (“It is only when the wrongful refusal at such an 
election is because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, that Congress can interfere, 
and provide for its punishment.”); see also Katz, Reinforcing Representation, supra note 208, at 
2360 (“Reese . . . establish[es] definitively that Congress can broadly reach private action when 
acting to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s proscription on race-based discrimination in 
voting.”).  
 399. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 138–39 (1903); Tolson, Spectrum, supra note 194, at 
337 (discussing James’s unprecedented holding). 
 400. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469–70 (1953) (plurality opinion) (concluding that the 
Jaybird Association’s exclusion of Black people from its Democratic Party straw poll qualified as 
state action and thus violated the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 401. Note, The Strange Career of “State Action” under the Fifteenth Amendment, 74 YALE L.J. 
1448, 1459 (1965). Similar questions about state action arose under the VRA, and the Court took 
an expansive view of state action there as well. See Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517 U.S. 
186, 219 (1996) (plurality opinion) (determining that a change to political party’s nominating 
process had to be precleared under Section 5 of the VRA).  
 402. The Fourteenth Amendment does not cover private action. See supra Part II.B. 
 403. See Karlan & Levinson, supra note 27, at 1203 (“Although states cannot prohibit racially 
polarized voting directly, race-conscious districting offers an effective technique for combating its 
effects.”). This point applies to both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 
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3. Congress’s Fifteenth Amendment Enforcement Authority.  
Finally, reconceptualizing vote dilution claims under the Fifteenth 
Amendment will help rebut arguments that Congress exceeded its 
enforcement authority when it revised Section 2 in 1982. Even if vote 
dilution claims fall outside the Fifteenth Amendment’s substantive 
scope, that is not the end of the matter.404 After all, Congress may pass 
“appropriate” legislation to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.405 As 
the above discussion demonstrates, the Fifteenth Amendment contains 
ambiguous language.406 Although “Congress may enact so-called 
prophylactic legislation”407 under Boerne’s court-centric view of 
constitutional interpretation,408 it would have greater leeway to 
independently interpret the scope of the “right . . . to vote” and the 
meaning of “abridge” under Katzenbach’s rationality standard.409 
Thus, Section 2 is on far firmer constitutional ground if Katzenbach 
supplies the governing constitutional standard. 
Although the Reconstruction Amendments contain “virtually 
identical” enforcement clauses,410 there are good reasons for 
differentiating between them in light of current doctrine. The Fifteenth 
Amendment’s targeted protections against racial discrimination in 
voting raise far fewer separation-of-powers concerns than the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s capacious language.411 The Court, 
moreover, has never decided whether Boerne’s congruence and 
proportionality test applies to the Fifteenth Amendment. None of the 
Boerne line of cases “involve[] race, voting, the Fifteenth Amendment, 
 
 404. Strictly speaking, it is unnecessary for the Court to clearly define the substantive scope 
of the underlying constitutional right under Katzenbach’s rationality standard. See Katzenbach v. 
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 645, 648 (1966). The same is not true under Boerne. See Bd. of Trs. of the 
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001). 
 405. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. 
 406. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 407. Nev. Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 727–28 (2003). 
 408. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527 (1997) (“Any suggestion that Congress 
has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our 
case law.”).  
 409. See McConnell, Institutions, supra note 210, at 184 (noting that, under Katzenbach, the 
question is “whether the congressional interpretation is within a reasonable range of plausible 
interpretations—not whether it is the same as the Supreme Court’s”). 
 410. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373 n.8 (2001). 
 411. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—And Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 109, 119–20 (2013); Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on 
Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1190–91 (2001); Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 
1626. 
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or Congress’s authority to remedy racial discrimination in voting.”412 
Furthermore, the Shelby County Court did not hold that Boerne 
applies to the Fifteenth Amendment.413  
Rather, “Shelby County’s equal sovereignty principle is an 
example of freestanding federalism and is thus limited to laws that 
differentiate between the states.”414 In Allen v. Cooper,415 the Court 
confronted its first post-Shelby County case concerning Congress’s 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement authority.416 In striking down a 
nationwide statute,417 the Allen Court applied Boerne’s congruence and 
proportionality test and failed to even cite Shelby County.418 The 
omission of Shelby County’s equal sovereignty language was perhaps 
unsurprising given that the challenged statute did not differentiate 
between the states. However, Allen also omitted any reference to 
Shelby County’s requirement that “a statute’s ‘current burdens’ must 
 
 412. Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1575. Some Justices may be open to applying 
Katzenbach’s rationality standard to statutes enacted under Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement authority to remedy racial discrimination. Indeed, Justice Scalia adhered to this 
position. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 564 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (renouncing 
Boerne and stating that “principally for reasons of stare decisis, I shall henceforth apply the 
permissive McCulloch standard to congressional measures designed to remedy racial 
discrimination by the States”). 
 413. See Elmendorf & Spencer, Racial Stereotyping, supra note 52, at 1129 (“Shelby County 
dodged an important question about the standard of review . . . .”); Richard L. Hasen, Shelby 
County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 727 (2014) (criticizing 
“the Court’s decision to sidestep the standard of review” question in Shelby County); Tolson, 
Spectrum, supra note 194, at 337 (“It is unclear if City of Boerne also applies to the Fifteenth 
Amendment . . . .”). 
 414. Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1575–76 (quotation marks and footnote omitted). 
Coined by Professor John Manning, the concept of freestanding federalism describes cases where 
the Court employs a structural argument to invalidate a federal statute “without purporting to 
ground its decision[] in any particular provision of the constitutional text.” John F. Manning, 
Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 
2005 (2009). Other scholars have argued that Shelby County is an example of freestanding 
federalism. See Colby, supra note 233, at 1168; Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 
MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1259 (2016); cf. Tolson, Reinventing, supra note 186, at 1259 (predicting after 
Northwest Austin that its “free-floating federalism norm c[ould] raise the evidentiary threshold 
so high that Congress could never amass enough evidence of voting discrimination to justify the 
renewal of section 5 or develop a coverage formula”). 
 415. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020). 
 416. See Travis Crum, The Curious Disappearance of Shelby County, ELECTION L. BLOG 
(Mar. 27, 2020, 7:03 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=110263 [https://perma.cc/4DXZ-2NLF]. 
 417. See Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1007 (finding that Congress’s abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity in the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act of 1990 was unconstitutional). 
 418. See id. at 1004–05. 
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be justified by ‘current needs,’”419 demonstrating that this prong of the 
test is contingent on a differentiation between the states.420 Allen thus 
established that Shelby County is limited to coverage formulas. Given 
that Section 2 is a “nationwide ban on racial discrimination,”421 Shelby 
County’s equal sovereignty principle is simply not implicated. 
Accordingly, defending Section 2 under the Fifteenth 
Amendment and Katzenbach’s rationality standard is not only 
doctrinally open but also strategically savvy because Congress would 
be given far greater interpretive and remedial authority to protect the 
right to vote. And that is true regardless of whether the Fifteenth 
Amendment itself prohibits vote dilution. 
To sum up, there are several doctrinal payoffs for 
reconceptualizing vote dilution claims under the Fifteenth 
Amendment. First, grounding racial vote dilution claims in the 
Fifteenth Amendment is more historically appropriate given the 
Reconstruction Framers’ views on the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments’ protections for distinct bundles of rights. And because 
the Court’s colorblind vision of the Equal Protection Clause ignores 
the key differences between voting rights and other rights, defending 
racial vote dilution claims under the Fifteenth Amendment will 
encourage jurists to rethink how they have applied Fourteenth 
Amendment principles to Fifteenth Amendment cases. Second, the 
Fifteenth Amendment casts a wider net than the Fourteenth 
Amendment for what qualifies as state action. As such, the Court can 
properly look at the interaction between racial bloc voting and dilutive 
schemes in adjudicating redistricting suits and determining whether 
Section 2 is constitutional. And finally, because Congress has greater 
leeway under current doctrine to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment 
than the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2 is on firmer ground against 
the inevitable constitutional challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s aversion to acknowledging the reality of 
racially polarized voting and its hostility to race-based redistricting 
have shaped voting rights doctrine for over twenty-five years. The 
 
 419. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 550 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. 
No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009)). 
 420. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 25, at 1576 (arguing that Shelby County “melded these 
two principles into one standard”). 
 421. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 557. 
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Court’s approach, however, ignores the historical context of 
Reconstruction and the important differences between the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments.  
Racial bloc voting was not a taboo that went unmentioned by the 
Reconstruction Framers. Rather, it was a key reason motivating the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s passage and ratification. And because racially 
polarized voting is a prerequisite to a vote dilution claim, 
reconstructing racially polarized voting moves those claims far closer 
to the heart of the Reconstruction Amendments and bolsters the 
constitutionality of the Gingles factors and Section 2. This historical 
intervention also reorients voting rights doctrine toward the Fifteenth 
Amendment and away from the colorblind concerns that have 
animated equal-protection and voting-rights jurisprudence for the past 
few decades. 
